University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Faculty Scholarship

Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty

2013

Philanthropic Innovation and Creative Capitalism: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective on Social Entrepreneurship and
Corporate Social Responsibility
Shruti Rana
University of Maryland Franics King Carey School of Law, shrutirana@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons

Digital Commons Citation
64 Alabama Law Review 1121 (2013).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty at
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

5 RANA 1121-1174 (DO NOT DELETE)

6/12/2013 3:30 PM

PHILANTHROPIC INNOVATION AND CREATIVE CAPITALISM:
A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Shruti Rana*
ABSTRACT
Each generation creates its own philanthropic bodies, with novel
structures promising both increased sustainability and efficiency. From the
seventeenth-century financial imperialists to today’s internet
entrepreneurs, innovation, wealth, and philanthropy have moved in
tandem, shaping one another and resulting in new philanthropic forms.
The most recent of these emerging entities is the “for-profit charity,”
which relies on market profits and market principles to replace donations
and to maximize its impact. Current philanthropic literature praises these
market-based structures as revolutionary innovations that enhance longterm sustainability, and the focus of legal reforms falls along these lines.
Yet the legal literature fails to fully appreciate the lessons of history.
Although state after state is authorizing or fostering the growth of such
hybrid entities, and although these entities do have the potential to
contribute to philanthropy in novel ways, without a broader set of legal and
regulatory reforms, the new philanthropic entities now emerging will be
unable to meaningfully harness market forces to enhance their
philanthropic endeavors.
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This Article argues that the key philanthropic innovation transforming
society today is not the public–private hybrid model. An examination of the
history of philanthropic innovation in the U.S. and in other nations exposes
what the current legal literature largely overlooks. That is, historical and
comparative case studies reveal that meaningful and lasting philanthropic
change arises when philanthropic entities are able to capture and utilize
the market innovations that are transforming society and leading to bursts
of industrial or technological progress. Thus, groundbreaking
philanthropic change comes when charitable entities can harness such
transformative commercial and technological developments towards
charitable ends.
In this light, the most critical philanthropic innovation transforming
society today is not the public–private hybrid idea, but rather the littlestudied phenomenon of firms applying to philanthropy the ideas that made
them successful in the marketplace. Understanding this underappreciated
nexus between business and philanthropy is vital for harnessing the larger
potential of new philanthropy, as well as for promoting regulatory action
that can enhance both business and philanthropic innovation. Recognizing
philanthropic entrepreneurialism as a reflection of, and reaction to,
commercial innovations such as the development of capital-pooling models
or internet social networks, is imperative for the design of a more proactive
and efficient regulatory regime.
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INTRODUCTION
Bill Gates, Sergey Brin, and Mark Zuckerberg1 each have at least one
particular aspect in common besides their immense wealth—each of them
has been able to parlay novel entrepreneurial and commercial success into
cutting-edge philanthropic endeavors.2
In doing so, each has sought to change not just the marketplace but the
law itself, to create novel legal structures that would foster their
philanthropic and entrepreneurial goals.3 But the law’s response to
philanthropic entrepreneurship has been uneven, sometimes lagging behind

1.
Each has achieved considerable wealth through founding and running innovative companies
and is often counted among a new group of “philanthrocapitalists.” The term “philanthrocapitalists”
refers to “a fast-growing army of new philanthropists” who believe they can and are improving
philanthropy by “equipping it to tackle the new set of problems facing today’s changing world . . . .
They think they can do a better job than their predecessors . . . [by] trying to apply the secrets behind
that money-making success to their giving.” See MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN,
PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW THE RICH CAN SAVE THE WORLD 2–3 (2008). For a more in-depth
description of their cutting-edge philanthropic work, see infra Part II.A.2.
2.
See, e.g., THE BILL AND MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/
Pages/home.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). For examples of the foundation’s activities, see What Does
IVCC Do?, IVCC, http://www.ivcc.com/about/what_is_ ivcc.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (describing
the “Innovative Vector Control Consortium” established by investment from the Gates Foundation);
Andy Beckett, Inside the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2010, 4:49 PM),
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/ 12/bill-and-melinda-gates-foundation. For an example of Sergey
Brin’s philanthropic endeavors, see Suzie Boss, Do No Evil, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Fall 2010,
at 66. For examples of Mark Zuckerberg’s philanthropic endeavors, see Nicholas Confessore, PolicyMaking Billionaires, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/sundayreview/policy-making-billionaires.html.
3.
Each of these entrepreneurs has tried, in different ways, to meld the boundaries between forprofit and non-profit enterprises in terms of their corporate goals. The founders of Google provide a
good example:
When Google went public in 2004, the Internet search company’s wunderkind founders,
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, penned a letter to prospective shareholders that has become the
Internet industry’s version of the Magna Carta. In it, they pledged that Google was “not a
conventional company” but one focused on “making the world a better place.”
. . . In the prospectus for what could be a record . . . public offering, Facebook founder
Mark Zuckerberg promises that a similar philosophy will guide the social network. “Simply
put: we don’t build services to make money; we make money to build better services.”
Rob Cox, The Ruthless Overlords of Silicon Valley, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 19, 2012, at 36. See also Shruti
Rana, From Making Money Without Doing Evil to Doing Good Without Handouts: The Google.org
Experiment in Philanthropy, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87 (2008).
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change and sometimes regulating “doing good” in a manner that hinders
rather than fosters creativity.4
This Article argues that for-profit charities (also sometimes referred to
as “for-profit/non-profit” hybrids or as just “hybrids”),5 the newest form of
emerging philanthropic structures, are better understood not as the
groundbreaking philanthropic innovation of our time but rather as part of a
recurring theme throughout the history of philanthropy. Each generation,
new philanthropic entities arise, heralded by the advent of novel structural
mechanisms that promise both (1) to lead to greater sustainability of
philanthropic endeavors (by reducing dependence on “traditional” donative
or grant-based models) and (2) to capture market forces in innovative ways
to ameliorate the common criticisms of inefficiency and the perceived
excesses of philanthropic entities designed by prior generations.6
Yet an examination of case studies in the historical record suggests that
these novel forms of philanthropy are often built and funded by individuals
with deep pockets of new wealth and that these vast fortunes have in turn
been generated by new and transformative technological and commercial
innovations.7 Thus, this Article further argues that the link between
technological or commercial change and philanthropic entrepreneurship
may be a critical and largely missing part of the philanthropic story, and

4.
The law regulating philanthropic entities is in flux both at the federal and state levels. See Press
Release, Grassley Urges Attention to Charitable Loophole Subsidized by Taxpayers (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=37495; see also Letter
from P. Russell Hardin, President, Lettie Pate Whitehead Foundation, to Emily McMahon, Acting
Assistant Sec’y of Tax Policy (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.pgdc.com/pgdc/foundationtakes-exception-grassleys-characterization-supporting-organizations. See also Robert Lang & Elizabeth
Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15 (2010)
(outlining the history of the L3C and explaining that the L3C was first conceived of in 2005, but was
formed to solve a problem that has been around since 1969). For a rich, historical review of the failure
of the law to keep pace with philanthropic endeavors, see generally David Villar Patton, The Queen, the
Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective on Charitable
Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2000).
5.
See, e.g., Robin Rogers, Why Philanthro-Policymaking Matters, 48 SOC’Y 376, 380 (2011),
available at http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs12115-011-9456-1 (using the term “forprofit-nonprofit hybrids” to describe one type of philanthropic structure, a structure that will be
described in more detail infra).
6.
See MARK DOWIE, AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS: AN INVESTIGATIVE HISTORY 8–11 (2002)
(describing recurring phases within philanthropic entities, and noting that this pattern has repeated
throughout American philanthropic history). See also BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 2 (describing
several golden ages of modern philanthropy, and noting that “[t]he new philanthropists believe they are
improving philanthropy, equipping it to tackle the new set of problems facing today’s changing world;
and to be blunt, it needs improvement—much philanthropy over the centuries has been ineffective.
They think they can do a better job than their predecessors”).
7.
See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 21 (“[I]t seems to be a feature of capitalism that golden
ages of wealth creation give rise to golden ages of giving. . . . Each past boom in giving was associated
with massive wealth creation linked to innovation in business, and also to social upheaval that left big
problems to solve.”).
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that this link could be the key to understanding the past, present and future
of philanthropic innovation.
Though our history suggests that such leaps of progress and innovation
are recurring—not isolated—phenomena, the link between technological
and commercial progress and philanthropic innovation has to date been
little studied.8 This neglect is particularly striking given the amount of
debate over the tax status and corporate structure of philanthropic entities.9
The lack of research in this area is even more remarkable given that the
field of philanthropy itself is richly grounded in dialogues over religion,
philosophy, and social justice, among other deeply divisive and meaningful
societal debates—issues that are largely left out of current regulatory
dialogues over tax and corporate structures for philanthropic entities.10
In this light, this Article argues that the tax and corporate structure
lenses most often used in the legal literature on philanthropy11 are too
narrow to capture critical aspects of current philanthropic innovation.
Moreover, much of the history and comparative underpinnings of
philanthropy have gone largely unrecognized by the legal literature.12
Accordingly, this Article attempts to fill some of these gaps in the existing

8.
See Zoltan J. Acs & Ronnie J. Phillips, Entrepreneurship and Philanthropy in American
Capitalism, 19 SMALL BUS. ECON. 189, 189 (2002) (“Th[e] entrepreneurship–philanthropy nexus has
not been fully explored by either economists or the general public.”). Some experts explain the lack of
research on foundations as a result of the lack of independent funding for such research:
Despite their material resources and multiple activities there has been comparatively little
independent research on foundations in the United States. This neglect is understandable.
Since foundations are a frequent source of financial support for research, scholars are
somewhat reluctant to subject them to scrutiny; foundations for their part, with a few notable
exceptions, have been inhibited about funding independent examinations of their roles and
impact. Yet fresh analysis is needed because foundations as a group constitute a significant
institution in the United States and, as such, cannot claim immunity from public interest and
scrutiny. It also is needed because without adequate knowledge and understanding, there is a
danger that criticism will be uninformed and that governmental action to control or regulate
foundations could be inappropriate or counterproductive.
M.J. Rossant, Foreword to WALDEMAR E. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS, at vi, vii (1972). See
MICHAEL EDWARDS, SMALL CHANGE: WHY BUSINESS WON’T SAVE THE WORLD 35 (2010) (“Anyone
looking for scientific proof that philanthrocapitalism does or does not work is sure to be
disappointed. . . . [A]lthough some serious studies of social enterprise and venture philanthropy exist,
by and large the literature is anecdotal or written by evangelists more interested in publicity than
rigor.”).
9.
See infra Part II.B for a description of these debates.
10.
See, e.g., Helmut K. Anheier & Lester M. Salamon, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative
Perspective, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, 89, 89–91 (Walter W. Powell &
Richard Steinberg eds., 2006) (surveying the national, religious, ethical, and civic sources of charitable
and non-profit organizations); see also Julie Battilana, Matthew Lee, John Walker, & Cheryl Dorsey, In
Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2012, at 51, 53 (noting that
“[a]reas of corporate law, such as the tax code, were not built for organizations that pursue social and
financial value” such as for-profit/non-profit hybrids).
11.
See Battilana et al., supra note 10; see also infra Part II.B.
12.
See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
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literature by identifying and analyzing some of the forces that drive
philanthropic innovation, and by pointing the way toward legal and
regulatory reforms that can help support innovation. Ultimately, this Article
aims to add to the efforts supporting “companies that believe in something
beyond simply maximizing profits”13 and seeks to do so by looking beyond
the for-profit/non-profit debate currently in vogue.14
To move beyond these debates, this analysis looks both to the present
and the past. Since the rise of modern philanthropy in the United States,
there have been numerous calls to reform philanthropic entities based on
tax and corporate governance reforms or to restructure philanthropic bodies
to better harness market profit mechanisms.15 But history shows that
merely unleashing the profit motive is not enough to foster lasting
innovation. Rather, the focus of legal reform should be broadened to foster
the application of technological and commercial structural innovations to
philanthropic endeavors.
Finally, this Article seeks to draw lessons for today from its analysis of
the past. It argues that the dominant legal paradigm has largely failed to
account for the key factor transforming philanthropy today.
It is not bridging the for-profit/non-profit divide that has transformed
philanthropy, but rather is the merging of information technology and
philanthropy—the efforts of philanthropies to engage with the “disruptive
technology” (the internet and social media) of our time. However, the
dominant paradigm’s focus on hybrid entities is too limited to adequately
promote and support such philanthropic entrepreneurship, particularly since
it does not address recent developments in securities laws and other
regulatory regimes affecting innovation.
This is significant because if we recognize philanthropic
entrepreneurialism as a reflection of, and parallel to, technological and
commercial innovations such as the development of capital pooling models
or internet social networks, we can create a better path forward for
proactive regulation of philanthropic innovation. To foster philanthropic
entrepreneurship, then, we cannot just focus on tax or corporate structures,

13.
See Cox, supra note 3, at 36.
14.
See James R. Hines, Jr., Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A
Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179 (2010); Klaus Schwab, Global Corporate Citizenship:
Working with Governments and Civil Society, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 107, 113 (2008) (“Corporate social
responsibility means addressing the wider financial, environmental, and social impact of all that a
company does. It entails minimizing the negative effects of the actions of a company and maximizing
the positive ones on stakeholders as well as on the communities in which the enterprise operates and the
governments with which it must work.”). See generally BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1.
15.
See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for
Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 577 (2009) (“[R]eforms are needed to level the playing field in the
market so that altruism is delivered efficiently to individuals demanding it and benefits are delivered
efficiently to recipients of charity.”).
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but must also look at reforms to securities and investor protection laws,
consumer protection laws, and anti-fraud rules, among other areas of law.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, in Part I, this Article traces the
history of philanthropy in the United States, using key examples to show
that philanthropic innovation has consistently paralleled technological or
market innovations. The analysis in Part I shows that many of the most
successful philanthropists of their day were able to draw upon their
commercial inventions, technological discoveries, or synergies with their
business successes in their philanthropic endeavors—sometimes, and
significantly, directly applying their commercial innovations to the
philanthropic realm. It also discusses the emergence of “American
Exceptionalism”16 in the philanthropic realm.
This Article then proceeds in Part II to analyze how philanthropies
have been regulated under U.S. law. Part II first explains how
philanthropies obtained “favored tax status” and discusses the current
debate over for-profit and for-profit/non-profit hybrid philanthropies. It
then describes the new corporate structures states have created to
accommodate “for-profit” philanthropies and sets out a typology of these
new public-private entities. This typology of new corporate structures
emphasizes the common goals or purposes behind each structure despite
the different structural approaches legislators and their founders have
taken. This Part analyzes how, like many of today’s philanthropists and
legislators, the dominant paradigm in current philanthropic literature
praises these hybrid structures as offering a revolutionary solution to the
problems facing philanthropy and long-term philanthropic sustainability.17

16.
The term “American Exceptionalism” is itself highly debated, but is often used to refer to
“ideas ranging from an empirical observation of difference to a normative assertion of the right to be
different.” Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1582 (2006). In this Article, the term will be
used to refer to historical, legal, and societal differences between the ways in which American
policymakers, philanthropists, and donors approach philanthropy as compared to other nations.
17.
See Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont’s Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and Questions
to Ponder, 35 VT. L. REV. 163, 179 (2010) (“The entrepreneurs were delighted to find a business entity
that allowed them to pursue their dual values of improving the community and operating a sustainable
market-responsive enterprise.”); Robert Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L.
REV. 59, 85 (2010) (“For-profit social enterprises can address some of the real or perceived
shortcomings associated with commercial and donative nonprofits. With the right organizational form, a
social enterprise can have both greater access to equity capital and a deeply embedded, sustainable
commitment to social purposes.”); see, e.g., Jay Milbrandt, A New Form of Business Entity Is Needed to
Promote Social Entrepreneurship: The Not-For-Loss Corporation, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.
421 (2008); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017
(2007) (arguing in favor of for-profit charities); see also Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit
Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2437 (2009); Michelle Scholastica Paul, Bridging the Gap to
the Microfinance Promise: A Proposal for a Tax-Exempt Microfinance Hybrid Entity, 42 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 1383 (2010).
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This Part also identifies some of the tensions and gaps in the current legal
typology or framework supporting philanthropic innovation.
Building on this framework, in Part III this Article seeks to identify
some of the transformative philanthropic innovations of our time. It argues
that currently the critical innovation is not the “for-profit” hybrid
philanthropy or related corporate structures. Rather, while lawmakers and
scholars have been focusing on the hybrid entity as the new philanthropic
innovation, the most important new innovation is the application of market
and technological innovations to the philanthropic realm. Viewed in this
light, many of the most successful philanthropies now and historically are
those that are able to identify, utilize, and develop key commercial or
market innovations in their philanthropic endeavors. To underscore this
point, this Part analyzes some of the failures of the for-profit philanthropy
model, and uses these failures to highlight why broader legal reform is
needed.
To put these changes into broader context, this Part also argues that the
blurring of lines between public and private in the philanthropic realm now
taking place can be viewed as part of the massive changes now occurring in
capitalism itself. Current forms of philanthropic innovation reflect the
dynamism within the larger force of creative capitalism18—in essence, we
may be in the midst of a new wave of philanthropic change in the United
States focused on information technology, where once again capitalism and
philanthropy are inextricably intertwined.
Finally, Part III discusses ways to foster philanthropic innovation
through regulatory flexibility, arguing that U.S. legislation should permit
greater flexibility in the structural form of philanthropies, allowing the
formation of creative structures while still seeking to regulate these new
forms (for example, by imposing mission, transparency, accountability, and
consumer and financial protection requirements). In these ways, this Article
seeks to draw from the lessons of history and from comparative
perspectives, and seeks to start a new dialogue exploring how to harness
the potential of market forces, while still preserving the goals of
philanthropy.

18.
Bill Gates has defined creative capitalism as a two-way process where at the same time
individual philanthropists are “catching the philanthrocapitalism bug and getting into giving—or at least
trying to do good. Gates sees this as potentially the start of a ‘system innovation’ in how business
operates . . . .” BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 7. In this Article, creative capitalism will be used
more broadly to cover philanthropic entrepreneurialism as a form of capitalistic dynamism, while also
recognizing that in modern American philanthropy, capitalism and philanthropy are inextricably
intertwined and shape and influence one another.
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I. WAVES OF PROGRESS: UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORY OF
PHILANTHROPY IN THE UNITED STATES
Progress comes in waves.19 Technological or commercial innovation
often occurs in leaps and bounds,20 and such innovation in turn can lead to
far-reaching, rapid change in the field of philanthropy. In many ways, the
history of philanthropy in the United States is the story of how sudden
surges in technological or commercial progress have led to the
accumulation of great wealth in the hands of a few, and how some of those
few have creatively chosen to channel part of their commercial gains into
philanthropy.21
Many scholars have focused on the idea that “technological innovation
comes in bursts of change” and applied this insight to economic and
political theory, among other fields.22 Within these analyses, and in the
legal literature, however, the link between commercial innovation and

19.
See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES
10 (2010) (arguing that information technology follows a “distinctive pattern” of development, in which
“[e]very few decades, a new communications technology appears, bright with promise and possibility”
and “inspires a generation to dream of a better society”); id. at 20 (“The Cycle is powered by disruptive
innovations that upend once thriving industries, bankrupt the dominant powers, and change the
world.”); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967)
(“New techniques, new ways of doing the same things, and doing new things—all invoke harmful and
beneficial effects to which society has not been accustomed. It is my thesis . . . that the emergence of
new property rights takes place in response to the desires of the interacting persons for adjustment to
new benefit–cost possibilities [as opposed to a search for just rules.]”).
20.
See WU, supra note 19, at 10, 20–21.
21.
See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 13–17.
22.
See generally MICHAEL LIND, A LAND OF PROMISE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 5–6 (2012) (“Beginning with the Austrian American economist Joseph Schumpeter in the 1920s
and 1930s, many students of economic history have argued that technological innovation comes in
bursts of change, followed by long periods in which the implications of the latest innovations are
worked out. Some economic historians have distinguished as many as five major waves of
technological change since the industrial era began. Many identify three, based on radically new
‘general purpose technologies’: the first industrial revolution of the late 1700s, based on the steam
engine; the second industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century, based on electricity, automobiles,
and science-based chemical industries; and the third industrial revolution of the mid- and late twentieth
century, based on the computer.”). Lind also goes on to discuss theories of American political history
that view the United States as having gone through two or three regimes or informal republics. For a
similar argument focusing on the organization of American foundations, rather than its links to
commercial activity, see DOWIE, supra note 6, at 2 (“We can conceive of that first century of American
foundation history as three, somewhat indistinct waves or periods of development, each with its own
overriding purpose[.] The waves overlap and are only imprecisely bounded by particular historical
events. Although many common themes endure through all three periods, they are differentiated by
significant shifts in emphasis and in the priority placed on particular initiatives.”).
22.
See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 21 (“Since the birth of modern capitalism in Europe
during the Middle Ages, rich businesspeople have consistently played a leading role in solving the big
social problems of their day, often adapting the innovations of capitalism to make their philanthropy
more effective.”).
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philanthropic innovation has gone largely unrecognized or studied.23
Indeed, it is only recently that legal scholarship has begun to recognize the
related idea that information technologies themselves go through cycles of
development.24 This Article goes a step further and links the latest
information technology cycle to philanthropic change, as discussed infra.
A close reading of the history of charitable endeavors discussed here
shows that philanthropic innovation in the United States is both spawned
and shaped by commercial and technological innovation. Specifically,
technological and commercial innovation plays two roles. First, bursts of
innovation enable business success, generating large accumulations of
wealth, some of which is channeled into philanthropy.25 In particular, the
appearance or creation of large mobile funds—generally created as a
byproduct of commercial or technological leaps of progress—in turn “made
possible fundamental changes in philanthropy, [from] the rise of
foundations” to other forms of philanthropic change.26 Second, it provides
the new corporate forms or invention-based architecture around which the
new philanthropic entities are structured.
The far-reaching impacts of commercial transformations, and the links
between these business inventions and successes and philanthropic
innovation, have been little studied.27 The lack of scholarship and analysis

23.
After an extensive search, I was only able to find two authors, both non-legal academics, who
discuss the link between commercial innovation and philanthropy in a manner related to the ideas set
forth in this paper. See Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 189–90.
24.
See WU, supra note 19 and discussion therein.
25.
See supra note 7; see, e.g., David J. Teece, Business Models, Business Strategy and
Innovation, 43 LONG RANGE PLAN. 172, 173 (2010) (“To profit from innovation, business pioneers
need to excel not only at product innovation but also at business model design, understanding business
design options as well as customer needs and technological trajectories.”); see also Michael E. Porter &
Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002,
at 56, 57 (indicating the broad definition of philanthropy and noting that “[i]ncreasingly, philanthropy is
used as a form of public relations or advertising, promoting a company’s image or brand through causerelated marketing or other high-profile sponsorships,” which may be beneficial to the company).
26.
See REPORT OF THE PRINCETON CONFERENCE ON THE HISTORY OF PHILANTHROPY IN THE
UNITED STATES 14 (1956) [hereinafter PRINCETON CONFERENCE]. See also BISHOP & GREEN, supra
note 1, at 21 (“[T]o go further, it seems to be a feature of capitalism that golden ages of wealth creation
give rise to golden ages of giving.”).
27.
While a number of scholars and commentators have noted that philanthropic change appears
to occur in bursts or cycles, see PRINCETON CONFERENCE, supra note 26, at 13-16 (“An obvious pattern
for studying the history of philanthropy is by periods—colonial, nineteenth century, and so forth. . . . It
was the consensus, however, that period studies would be fruitful only if the period selected
corresponded with developments within philanthropy itself. Much research does no more than collect
empirical data; results are disappointing because the significant variables have not been emphasized.”),
few appear to have studied philanthropic development from this perspective, nor suggested the patterns
observed by this author. Indeed, even the related idea that information technologies themselves go
through cycles of development, WU, supra note 19, is considered new to the legal literature. See also
supra note 23 (discussing the scarcity of research on the topics discussed in this paper). This Article
goes a step further and links the latest information technology cycle to philanthropic change, as
discussed infra.
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on this subject is even more significant since this area of study is a rich
source of ideas and guidance for future innovation and regulation.28 To
begin addressing this gap in the scholarly literature, the next sections begin
an examination of these historical waves of progress, linking them to key
philanthropic developments.
As noted above, philanthropic evolution can be viewed as occurring
through leaps or waves of progress.29 The first of these waves of American
philanthropic progress actually began in England and then moved to the
United States.30 As American law draws its foundation and much of its
force from British history and common law,31 it is fitting that the story of
American philanthropic entrepreneurialism has its roots in the Britain of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
A. The Joint Stock Company
While American philanthropy has borrowed from Britain in many
ways, this Subpart focuses a historical lens on this Article’s first key
example of the link between commercial and philanthropic progress. In
seventeenth and eighteenth century England, a major commercial
innovation was the creation of a joint stock company.32 Joint stock
companies were a critical new commercial model that allowed companies
for the first time to pool large amounts of capital which could then be

28.
See Battilana et al., supra note 10, at 55 (“In the aftermath of the 2007–08 economic crisis,
the global economic system is still regarded as broken. Calls for reform have been particularly strong
among youth. Vast unemployment, ballooning debt, and entrenched inequality have left a generation of
young people frustrated with modern capitalism and motivated to change it. Among the voices for
reform, hybrid entrepreneurs are opening the way for a reformulation of the current economic order,
combining the principles, practices, and logics of modern capitalism with more inclusive humanitarian
ideals.”). While this example focuses on hybrid entities, philanthropic historians have also remarked
upon the rich of philanthropic history and the largely untapped lessons that can be learned from further
study. See, e.g., Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 189–90 (analyzing the unique relationship between
entrepreneurship and philanthropy in the United States and noting that “much of the new wealth created
historically has been given back to the community to build up the great social institutions that have a
positive feedback on future economic growth” (emphasis omitted)). See also DOWIE, supra note 6, at
xxvii (“History does reveal that foundations can be creators of a better world.” (emphasis omitted)).
29.
See DOWIE, supra note 6, at xx to xxvii, 2–21.
30.
See also Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 192 (“The roots of American philanthropy can be
found in England in the period from 1480–1660.”).
31.
See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS, MAKING AND DOING DEALS 6 (3rd ed. 2011) (“English contract
law . . . influenced the development of American contract law.”).
32.
Joint stock companies are considered to be antecedents of the modern corporation. The
innovations underlying joint stock companies include their fundraising structure, whereby the founders
raised capital by selling shares in the proposed profit-making venture, and a risk management structure
whereby individual shareholders were only liable up to the amount of their original investment. See
Joint Stock Companies, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
305668/joint-stock-company (last visited March 7, 2013).
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invested.33 Crucially, this new structure allowed investors to seek profits on
their investments while minimizing risk exposure.34 This capital-pooling
method was soon directly applied to the charitable realm.35 The inventors
of the joint stock companies applied commercial innovation to philanthropy
in two ways: first, they applied the excess profits they had earned towards
charitable endeavors.36 Second, they also directly applied the joint stock
capital-pooling model towards philanthropic ends.37 Specifically, they
sought subscriptions from the general public, pooled this capital, and used
it to fund charitable endeavors such as St. Guy’s hospital in London38—
projects which were more far-reaching than the government at that time
was inclined, or able, to provide.39 These new pooling structures also
multiplied the effect of charitable giving, greatly enhancing the impact of
the smaller-scale individual or community giving that had come before, and
providing risk management assurance for individuals who desired to
engage in larger scale charitable endeavors.40 Similar capital-pooling
philanthropic projects were soon started in the United States,41 and this new

33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 2; B. KIRKMAN GRAY, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
PHILANTHROPY 105 (1905) (“It is impossible to overrate their importance as the first concerted effort to
provide an elementary education for all the children of the country. They were also the first
considerable achievement of the new joint-stock principle in philanthropy.” (footnote omitted)).
36.
BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 2.
37.
Id.; see also Roger Jones, Richard Mead, Thomas Guy, the South Sea Bubble and the
Founding of Guy’s Hospital, 103 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 87 (2010).
38.
See Jones, supra note 37, at 87.
39.
See also GILLIAN WAGNER, THOMAS CORAM, GENT., 1668–1751, at 136 (2004) (including a
discussion on the founding of the Foundling Hospital, for example how letters were written to foundling
hospitals in the major cities of Europe asking how they were managed).
40.
The significance of this multiplier effect cannot be overstated. See GRAY, supra note 35, at 81
(“The early efforts of the associated philanthropy are based on the fact that while many were willing to
subscribe guineas, some were prepared to co-operate in persistent work for the relief of distress. At the
outset the two classes were not so sharply defined as they rapidly tended to become. The new impulse
was not the only one, and before describing it in fuller detail it is necessary to pause over the reminder
that the old tradition of charity showed no signs of falling into desuetude. The endowed charities,
deriving mainly from the familiar bequest did not cease; on the contrary they continued to become more
numerous. They were still administered, exactly as in earlier periods, with more or less efficiency. But
they showed little of that capacity possessed by the new methods of adapting themselves to the
changing perception on the part of the well-to-do of the mischances that befall the poor.”).
41.
Samuel A. Johnson, The Genesis of the New England Emigrant Aid Company, 3 NEW ENG. Q.
1, 95 (1930) (giving an account of the formation of an Emigrant Aid company by Eli Thayer—Thayer
himself established an abolitionist colony in what is now West Virginia and was a quite successful,
though not strictly, joint stock tycoon). See also Oscar Sherwin, Thomas Firmin: Puritan Precursor of
WPA, 22 J. MODERN HIST. 38 (1950) (discussing the schools Firmin created); Joint Stock Companies,
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, supra note 32 (noting that one of the earliest joint stock companies was the
Virginia Company, which was founded in 1606 with the aim of colonizing North America). See also
Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 192 (“The real founders of American philanthropy were the English
men and women who crossed the Atlantic to establish communities that would be better than the ones
they had known at home.”).
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philanthropic model became a great driving force for societal change in
both the United States and England.42 In fact, this new philanthropic
structure actually increased large-scale charity, as the risk management
assurances and high-flying goals of these ventures led many individuals to
participate in these philanthropic endeavors in cases where they might have
been hesitant to do so before for fear of losing their money or contributing
to failing projects.43 For example, one commentator has noted, “[i]t is
impossible to overrate” the importance of the joint-stock structure in
American philanthropy, as the philanthropists using this model formed “the
first concerted effort to provide an elementary education for all the children
of the country.”44
Thus, the legal and financial innovation of joint stock companies led in
turn to philanthropic change, as the fortunes of the day could be moved
towards charitable ends, with more impact than ever before, by the
application of the legal and financial capital-pooling innovation to
philanthropy.
Soon, however, the United States and England diverged in their
philanthropic approaches. American philanthropists began investing “their
resources in the greater American fight over the definition of the common
good”45 in the private marketplace, while in England the role of
government in philanthropy waxed and the role of private giving waned in
charitable endeavors, with the result that private giving began to play a
shrinking role in philanthropy in England.46 Indeed, it soon became clear
that in contrast to its English relatives, “American philanthropy would be a
capitalist venture in social betterment, not an act of kindness as understood
in Christianity.”47
B. The Roots of American Philanthropic Exceptionalism
For many years thereafter, American philanthropy was smaller in scale
than during the age of the flowering of the joint stock companies. American
philanthropic endeavors were generally structured as community-based
enterprises rather than as corporate or government-based philanthropies.48

42.
See GRAY, supra note 35, at 105.
43.
Id.at 107.
44.
Id. at 105.
45.
OLIVER ZUNZ, PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 5 (2012).
46.
Id. at 4.
47.
Id. at 2.
48.
See PRINCETON CONFERENCE, supra note 26, at 9 (noting that in the United States “colleges,
foundations, hospitals, health agencies, welfare societies, and many other institutions have originated
almost universally out of individual beneficence,” while in on other countries “the state or the church,
and sometimes a combination of the two, takes the initiative in these directions”).
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Initially, the “embryonic culture of an evolving philanthropy took root in a
fertile American soil where ‘communities existed before governments were
there to care for public needs.’”49 However, American philanthropy soon
became marked by its “unique encounter between charity and the state.”50
For instance, one example of the divergence noted above is that in
European countries (including the United Kingdom) where tax burdens are
higher, there has historically been less private philanthropy; in contrast, in
the U.S. the opposite has historically been true.51 The United States has
become somewhat “unique in the modern world for the encouragement it
still accords to private philanthropy.”52
It may be said, then, that American philanthropy has always
wrestled with the public-private divide and the nature of capitalism and
entrepreneurship, adding greater weight to the links between commercial
and philanthropic innovation.53 In describing this recurring theme, one
scholar described the entrepreneurial spirit embedded in the American
philanthropic realm as follows:
The unique culture that resulted from America’s principles of free
association and pluralism shaped a fresh new spirit of philanthropy
markedly different than that of other contemporary single-sector
societies dominated by Crown or Church. Philanthropy has
continued to play a vigorous role as change-agent and risk-taker in
American society. Because it is neither beholden to an electorate
nor driven by shareholders, the American philanthropic sector has

49.
Penina Kessler Lieber, 1601–2001: An Anniversary of Note, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 731, 734–35
(2001).
50.
ZUNZ, supra note 45, at 4.
51.
Emma Rees, Charity Crosses the Divide, CNBC BUSINESS (Dec. 2007),
http://web.archive.org/web/20101222235734/http://www.cnbcmagazine.com/story/charity-crosses-thedivide/313/1/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (citing Mark Evans for the belief that “Americans have an
apparent preference for supporting social services by giving to charity rather than the state” and citing
figures from the Charities Aid Foundation finding that individual giving in the U.S is at 1.7% of GDP,
while in the U.K., it is 0.73% of GDP in 2007). See also Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 194 (“Both our
entrepreneurial economic system and out philanthropic tradition spring for the same root: American
individualism. Other countries may be content to let the government run most of their schools and
universities, pay for their hospitals, subsidize their museums and orchestras, even in some cases support
religious sects. Americans tend to think most of these institutions are best kept in private hands, and
they have been willing to cough up the money to pay for them.”).
52.
NIELSON, supra note 8, at 5. Some have taken this idea even further. See DOWIE, supra note
6, at xxii (stating that “the art of philanthropy is an indisputably American invention. No other
civilization has been designed by the imagination of its organized philanthropists to quite the same
degree as the Unites States.”).
53.
See DOWIE, supra note 6, at xxi.
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been free to experiment and innovate in ways that government and
business dare not.54
Moreover, as another scholar put it, “because most of America’s original
philanthropists were capitalists or heirs of capitalists, the culture of
capitalism has quite naturally permeated the philanthropic imagination.”55
American exceptionalism in the philanthropic realm continues to this day.
As one commentator stated, “[c]ommerce and philanthropy are considered
to be polar opposites. They’re not; they are two sides of the same coin.
Both are about meeting the needs of people. To succeed in either sector
requires entrepreneurial innovation and energy. Hence, the seeming
paradox of the U.S.: The most commercial nation ever birthed is also the
most philanthropic.”56
In this sense, philanthropy in the United States is an example of
“American exceptionalism”57—philanthropy has developed and
transformed as capitalism itself in the United States has evolved, and has
done so in a way that is uniquely entrepreneurial and influenced by markets
as opposed to government action. It is also significant that, in contrast to
the United Kingdom and other modern European economies, “[i]n the U.S.,
much of the new wealth created historically has been given back to the
community; to build up the great social institutions that have a positive
feedback on future economic growth.”58 Thus, it can be said that “[t]he
‘science,’ if not the art of philanthropy is an indisputably American
invention. No other civilization has been designed by the imagination of its
organized philanthropists to quite the same degree as the United States.”59
C. The Rise of the Great American Foundations and Trusts and a New
Form of Leverage
It is fitting then that the next key example of the commercial–
philanthropic nexus focuses on the “uniquely American institutions” of
massive foundations and trusts.60 The next significant wave of progress for

54.
Lieber, supra note 49, at 735.
55.
DOWIE, supra note 6, at xxxvii.
56.
Steve Forbes, Why Philanthropy Must Have These 400-Type Entrepreneurs, FORBES (Sept. 9,
2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2012/09/19/why-philanthropy-must-havethese-400-type-entrepreneurs/2/.
57.
See generally Jerome Karabel, American Exceptionalism and the Battle for the Presidency,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerome-karabel/americanexceptionalism-obama-gingrich_b_1161800.html
(referencing
descriptions
of
American
exceptionalism, referring both to the uniqueness and singularity of American development).
58.
Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 193 (emphasis omitted).
59.
DOWIE, supra note 6, at xxii.
60.
Id. at 1.
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philanthropy in the U.S. came during the age of the robber barons. Once
again, “[t]he appearance of large, mobile funds in America made possible
fundamental changes in philanthropy,” this time in the form of “the rise of
foundations.”61 Great commercial innovators of the era, such as Andrew
Carnegie, accumulated vast wealth by inventing novel business methods
and ideas.62 They then “began casting about for a means to avoid taxes and
put their wealth to use in new and imaginative ways.”63
For example, after achieving great business and financial success,
Carnegie turned to philanthropy and “[o]ver the course of the next century,
philanthropists and their advisers followed in Carnegie’s footsteps,
perfecting the art of spending money for the common good.”64
Carnegie, for example, thought his philanthropy followed his own
“gospel of wealth”65 which he felt obligated him to return some of his
riches to society. In addition, he was “determined to do so by following the
same intelligent managerial principles that had made him a rich man.”66
Many other robber barons or recipients of great wealth followed the same
path.67 Indeed, it has been said that “it was largely through his ideas and
example that American philanthropy got off to such a bold and brilliant
start at the beginning of the twentieth century.”68
Carnegie introduced two key commercial innovations into the world of
philanthropy. First, he created a charitable trust to maintain his
philanthropic activities, designing a structure that retained a charitable
purpose while requiring the trustees to restrict the disposal of the trust’s
income and to keep the trust’s capital intact.69 He also applied the concept

61.
PRINCETON CONFERENCE, supra note 26, at 14; Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 190.
62.
See generally NIELSON, supra note 8, at Part 2.
63.
See DOWIE, supra note 6, at 1–2.
64.
ZUNZ, supra note 45, at 1.
65.
In 1889 Carnegie published the Gospel of Wealth, where he wrote of “the ‘disgrace’ of dying
rich” and his view that “the chief problem of his era was the proper administration of wealth so that ‘the
ties of brotherhood may still bind the rich and poor in harmonious relationships.’” NIELSON, supra note
8, at 32–33.
66.
ZUNZ, supra note 45, at 1.
67.
Id.
68.
NIELSON, supra note 8, at 31.
69.
See Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 193. (“Andrew Carnegie exemplified the ideal Calvinist.
Carnegie put philanthropy at the heart of his ‘gospel of wealth.’ For Carnegie, the question was not
only, ‘How to gain wealth?’ but, importantly, ‘What to do with it?’ The Gospel of Wealth suggested
that millionaires, instead of bequeathing vast fortunes to heirs or making benevolent grants by will,
should administer their wealth as a public trust during life.” (internal citations omitted)). Carnegie was
probably influenced by the structure and foundations of the Peabody Education Fund Trustees. This
fund, created by George Peabody, who chose to devote his fortune to philanthropy, “paved the way for
subsequent foundation aid to the South after the Civil War but also influenced the operational patterns
of subsequent major foundations including John D. Rockefeller’s Education Board, the Russell Sage
Foundation, and the Carnegie foundation.” Zoltan J. Acs, ‘Schumpeterian Capitalism’ in Capitalist
Development: Toward a Synthesis of Capitalist Development and the ‘Economy as a Whole,’ in ELGAR
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of leverage to his philanthropic endeavors. That is, rather than simply fully
funding an organization, such as a library, he created “the infrastructure
(the bricks and mortar) in return for which each community would commit
its full faith and credit to the stocking, staffing, and running of a library.”70
In this manner, “with the philanthropic outlay of a few million dollars,
Carnegie created a public institution—one that has since spent many, many
billions more than that making books available to the public free of
charge—[through the concept of] leverage.”71 Thus, Carnegie applied
another aspect of creative entrepreneurship (a financial leverage
mechanism) to his philanthropy.
Together with John Rockefeller, the first American billionaire,72
Carnegie helped create the largest wave of organized philanthropy to have
emerged up to that point in American history—the wave of the great
American foundations.73 The founders of this wave of philanthropy “shared
a conviction that society was advanced by the generation and sharing of
knowledge. They believed that new learning would create progress, expand
wealth, and advance civilization and human welfare.”74 In essence, then, as
one author put it, the American innovation with respect to the creation of
the big foundations was to “conceive of philanthropic funding as yet
another financial investment and to use the skills they had acquired in
business to minimize the risk of their speculations, and to vastly enlarge the
scope of their charitable giving.”75
The most important developments in the history of American
philanthropy thus all appear to be examples of a repeating cycle—a cycle
wherein commercial innovation leads to great concentrations of wealth,
which then leads the people who have accumulated great wealth from their
business success to apply similar skills and inventions into the
philanthropic realm.76 In this manner, transformative commercial or

COMPANION TO NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS 97, 100 (Horst Hanusch & Andreas Pyka eds.,
2007).
70.
DOWIE, supra note 6, at 3.
71.
Id.
72.
Id. See also The Centenarians Square Up, THE ECONOMIST (June 9, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18802844 (drawing comparisons between IBM and the Carnegie
Corporation in terms of their charitable work). See also John D. Rockefeller, 1839–1937, THE
ROCKEFELLER ARCHIVE CENTER, http://www.rockarch.org/bio/jdrsr.php (last visited May 9, 2013)
(referencing J.D. Rockefeller as a proponent of conditional giving, where a charity grants money on the
condition that additional funds or resources are put up by someone else, general the wider public, and in
turn the public is supposed to watch over the progress of the grant project.).
73.
See DOWIE, supra note 6, at 4.
74.
Id.
75.
ZUNZ, supra note 45, at 2.
76.
PRINCETON CONFERENCE, supra note 26, at 14; see generally A Chronological History of
Philanthropy in America, THE NATIONAL PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, http://www.nptrust.org/history-of-
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technological change, when combined with charitable motives, can lead to
further transformative change in the realm of philanthropy.
D. Philanthropy Adopting Commercial Innovations to Address Social
Upheaval
Consider the (somewhat lesser known) example of Edward Filene. This
example, coming after the age of the robber barons and great foundations,
but during a period of great social unrest,77 provides an example of
philanthropic creativity as a response and possible solution to social
upheaval. With his relatives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, Filene “introduced novel retailing techniques” to merchandise
stores.78 Filene “introduced the bargain basement concept” (hence the name
“Filene’s Basement”) as well as other retailing innovations. After achieving
financial success, he then turned to the field of philanthropy, eventually
founding credit unions (i.e., lending institutions organized as worker
cooperatives, often funded by members and providing “consumer and
mortgage credit to them”).79 In this manner, Filene used the notion of
cooperative associations to innovate the credit union. The creation and
development of the credit union has become “a critical source of lending
for low-income workers” with little or no recourse for credit.80 Again,
following the pattern repeated throughout the history of philanthropic
development, Filene applied a new capital-pooling and managerial method
that he had developed in the commercial realm to the philanthropic realm
(and thereby also helped foment significant societal change).81 This
example further shows how commercial and charitable innovations can be
inextricably intertwined.
giving (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (website run by the National Philanthropic Trust devoted to the
history of philanthropy in the United States).
77.
See, e.g., DOWIE, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that the “founders of that first wave of American
foundations shared a conviction that society was advanced by the generation and sharing of knowledge.
They believed that new learning would create progress, expand wealth, and advance civilization and
human welfare. And it would prevent reoccurrence of the enormous social unrest that had marked the
late nineteenth century and brought the specter of socialism to the attention of America’s capitalists.”).
78.
Yankl Stillman, Edward Filene: Pioneer of Social Responsibility, JEWISH CURRENTS, Sept.
2004, available at http://www.jewishcurrents.org/2004-sept-stillman.htm.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. For example, Filene also introduced the commercial concept of the “automatic basement,”
where unsold goods were reduced in price by 25% the first week, 50% over two weeks, and after four
weeks, were donated to charity. He also formed the Filene Cooperative Association, which allowed
workers a role in collective bargaining, and initiated profit-sharing, health clinics, paid vacations, and
welfare and insurance programs. Interestingly, like the “philanthrocapitalists” of our time and the
creators of the big foundations, Filene “had a deep social conscience” but “little use for charity, [instead
carrying a] deep faith in the capacity of people to improve themselves as long as they had good
information and the discipline to use it effectively.” Id.
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The next two Parts will discuss two other significant examples of the
commercial-philanthropic nexus. Part II.A. examines the ways in which
philanthropy and philanthropic structures underwent significant change
with the advent of corporate and individual income taxation in the U.S. Part
II.B. analyzes the regulatory regime which now governs American
philanthropy. It also discusses critiques of this system, which led to calls
for change, and the creation of new hybrid for-profit philanthropic entities.
Following this background, Part III will then discuss the emergence of
what this Article argues is the key philanthropic innovation of our time—
the transformation of social media and other internet-related technologies
for philanthropic ends.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PHILANTHROPIC REGULATION IN THE U.S.
A. The Origins of Philanthropic Regulation
Prior to the creation of the federal individual income tax in 1913,
philanthropic endeavors in the United States were either governed by state
law, or perceived as community self-help initiatives below the scope of the
law.82 After the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment allowed for the
creation of a federal individual income tax, the Revenue Act of 1913 was
enacted, including tax exemptions for “any corporation or association
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or
educational purposes.”83 In 1917, Congress made tax deductions available
to individuals “for their donations to these statutorily-defined nonprofit
organizations.”84 An organization obtains tax-exempt status allowing it to
receive tax-deductible charitable contributions from donors if the
organization fulfills the requirements of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.85 These requirements include that “no part of the net

82.
Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis,
20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 296 (2010). See also PRINCETON CONFERENCE, supra note 26, at 9
(noting that in the United States “colleges, foundations, hospitals, health agencies, welfare societies,
and many other institutions have originated almost universally out of individual beneficence” while in
other countries “the state or the church, and sometimes a combination of the two, takes the initiative in
these directions.”); Rees, supra note 51 (citing Mark Evans for the belief that “Americans have an
apparent preference for supporting social services by giving to charity rather than the state” and citing
figures from the Charities Aid Foundation finding that individual giving in the U.S. is at 1.7% of GDP,
while in the U.K. it is 0.73% of GDP in 2007).
83.
Doeringer, supra note 82, at 297. One interesting American philanthropic innovation that is
beyond the scope of this Article is that of the community trust. See generally Mark Sidel, Law,
Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance Power and the Battle for American Giving, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1145 (2003) (describing the origins and development of the modern variance power and the
community trust).
84.
Doeringer, supra note 82, at 297.
85.
Id.
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earnings of [the organization] inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.”86 In addition to this no-private-inurement
restriction, a non-profit organization must also “be operated exclusively for
an exempt purpose,” in addition to satisfying other requirements.87
Significantly, the development of this regulatory structure meant that
while “other western societies sought to solve such social problems [as
working conditions and race relations] through their central governments,
American foundations and nonprofit institutions created privately
supported and directed systems of social reform and welfare.”88 In this
manner, American exceptionalism in the field of philanthropy continued.
For many years the law regarding philanthropies remained largely taxrelated, and the debates over philanthropies were generally tied to their
corporate form or tax status.89 However, the rise of ideas such as corporate
social responsibility and greater attention to the failures of capitalism also
led to renewed emphasis on philanthropies,90 this time focusing on their
form. The corporate or non-profit structure to which American
philanthropy has been tied for the last century or longer is no longer
sufficient; our regulatory structure is lagging behind innovation, and must
evolve if philanthropic change is to be adequately supported or promoted.

86.
Id. at 298 (citing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2007)).
87.
Id.
88.
DOWIE, supra note 6, at 5.
89.
Id. at 298–300. See also PRINCETON CONFERENCE, supra note 26, at 14 (“Taxation has had a
radical influence upon philanthropic giving.”). For an overview of this literature, see generally Malani
& Posner, supra note 17 (considering theoretical justifications for the negative tax treatment of forprofit charities); id. at 2020 (“The problem for for-profit charities is that they forfeit all the state and
federal tax benefits available to nonprofit charities”); Reiser, supra note 17, at 2473 (“For-profit
philanthropy, though, differs from these familiar techniques in both structure and scale. Likewise, forprofit philanthropy stands in stark contrast to the nonprofit, tax-exempt form of organization typically
used by those pursuing exclusively philanthropic endeavors. This Essay investigates the for-profit
philanthropy model, drawing out these distinctions . . . .”). In addition, even arguments against forprofit charities tend to focus on tax issues. See, e.g., Hines et al., supra note 14, at 1179 (“Recent efforts
to extend some or all of these tax benefits to for-profit companies making social investments, including
the creation of the new hybrid nonprofit/for-profit company form known as the Low-Profit Limited
Liability Company, threaten to undermine the vitality of the nonprofit sector and the integrity of the tax
system.”). Comparatively few articles deal with new technology’s impact on philanthropy. See Kevin E.
Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-To-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1209, 1212 (2010) (“Mapping the space occupied by these new ‘peer-to-peer’
intermediaries is difficult: it spans multiple jurisdictions and governance regimes and embraces a vast
and growing variety of legal forms.”) (discussing microfinancing intermediary websites such as
Kiva.org); see also Rana, supra note 3. Other papers note the rise of new technology only in passing:
e.g., Jenkins, supra note 132, at 754 (“Lately, however, private foundations have become the target of
those seeking to harness the power of ‘market-based’ innovation, as a sort of new technology, to
contribute to the project of smarter philanthropy.”); Milbrandt, supra note 16. However, each of these
articles, while contributing valuable data and ideas to help understand the current wave of philanthropic
change, does not go as far as this Article in drawing explicit causal links between business or
commercial innovation and groundbreaking change in the philanthropic world.
90.
BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 2.
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Again, current philanthropic transformation contains echoes of the past.
“[D]uring the Great Depression, the federal government was finally forced
by market disruptions and poverty beyond the reach of private charity to
accept roles it had previously rejected, it embraced systems that had been
designed, tested, and promoted by private philanthropy.”91 Similarly,
American philanthropy is undergoing another transformation against a
backdrop of great financial and global turmoil. As one scholar has
suggested, and as this Article argues, that while “American philanthropy
continued to evolve . . . throughout the twentieth century, the shift it is
currently undergoing is more fundamental.”92
The next Subpart seeks to identify portions of this fundamental shift, a
shift which has gone largely unrecognized or identified in the legal
literature surrounding philanthropic structures and transformation. This
Subpart discusses current entrepreneurial innovation, and how that is being
applied in the philanthropic realm. It seeks to shift the focus of current
debate from the non-profit/for-profit hybrids to what this Article argues is
the contemporary example of the commercial-philanthropic nexus—the
transformation of social media for philanthropic ends.
1. Background
Before delving more deeply into the nature of philanthropic change, it
is important to define some of the terms and entities that have played
significant roles in this history, and to clarify how they will be used in this
Article. This Subpart sets out a framework for philanthropic endeavors
from public to private, for-profit to non-profit. It illustrates how forprofit/non-profit hybrids fit into the spectrum of philanthropic endeavors in
the United States. It also seeks to identify where gaps in the literature on
philanthropy and corporate social responsibility and social entrepreneurship
exist. In doing so, this Subpart seeks to set the stage for the historical and
comparative argument about the key philanthropic changes occurring today
in Part III.
First, the term “philanthropy”—which can be literally translated from
its Latin roots as the “love of humanity”—will be used to refer to “the
process of using money to create change,”93 which “encompasses all those
activities of giving and volunteering by which an individual responds
directly to those moral signals that communicate need.”94 While the

91.
92.
93.
94.

DOWIE, supra note 6, at 5.
Id. at xx.
Id. at xvi.
Richard Steinberg & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 1, 4.
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definition of philanthropy includes both the act of philanthropy and the
institutions that facilitate that act,95 this Article will focus on the second
category, that is, institutions that facilitate philanthropy.
Philanthropic organizations come in both public (government or nonmarket)96 and private (market-based or voluntarily funded)97 forms. These
forms can be viewed as falling across a spectrum of sectors of society.98 At
one end of this spectrum is the public or government sector. This sector
includes government-funded social service agencies, that is, organizations
operating under the control of public government agencies.99 In the United
States, government agencies are viewed as beholden to an electorate and its
chosen representatives.100
In the middle of the spectrum is the non-profit sector, which includes
the collection of private (as opposed to governmental) entities defined as
non-profits.101 Non-profit organizations are organizations “precluded, by
external regulation or [their] own governance structure[s], from distributing
[their] financial surplus to those who control the use of organizational
assets.”102 As embodied in the non-profit statutes in each of the fifty U.S.
states, non-profit “boards have some ownership rights, such as the right to
direct the use of [the organization’s] resources, but [do not have the right]
to profit from [the] use of [the organization’s] resources [or] to sell these
rights to others for a profit.”103 These organizations are also generally taxexempt under the U.S. federal tax code.104
At the far end of the economic spectrum are for-profit organizations.
The for-profit sector includes both for-profit/non-profit hybrids as well as
traditional for-profit companies. For-profit firms, whether philanthropic in
their aims or not, provide full ownership rights to those in control of
95.
See id. at 3.
96.
See Knowledge Base, GRANTSPACE, http://grantspace.org/Tools/Knowledge-Base/FundingResearch/Definitions-and-Clarification/Private-foundations-vs-public-charities (last visited Mar. 6,
2013) (“Public charities generally derive their funding or support primarily from the general public,
receiving grants from individuals, government, and private foundations.”).
97.
See id. (“A private foundation . . . usually derives its principal fund from a single source, such
as an individual, family, or corporation, and more often than not is a grantmaker. A private foundation
does not solicit funds from the public.”).
98.
See Steinberg & Powell, supra note 94, at 2 (“Most leading theories of . . . the nonprofit
sector adopt this concept of a trichotomy of sectors—nonprofit, for-profit, and government.”).
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Id. at 1–2.
102.
Id. at 1.
103.
Id. The U.S Internal Revenue Code categorizes independent sector organizations as Section
501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) organizations, which includes charitable organizations and some mutual benefit
corporations. Tax-exempt entities include a variety of profit-distributing and nondistributing
organizations that are exempt from the U.S. Federal Corporate Income Tax. Id. at 3. Tax-exempt
entities will be discussed further infra.
104.
Id. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)–(4).
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organizational assets. This includes rights to direct, profit from, and sell
ownership.105 In general, for-profit organizations “focus . . . on shareholder
value maximization and are permitted to distribute returns to investors.”106
For-profit businesses, or what are viewed as traditional corporations,
also participate in philanthropic endeavors. Every corporation is subject to
corporate governance laws imposing regulatory accountability,
transparency and other legal requirements and may choose to abide by
social codes of conduct which set forth a company’s socially beneficial
aims.107 Corporate philanthropy involves cash contributions, grants,
donations, or investments in philanthropic organizations, which only
sometimes includes engagement beyond simply handing out money in the
forms described above.108
Corporate social responsibility and social entrepreneurship, on the
other hand, include far greater engagement with philanthropy. Corporate
social responsibility refers to the acts of corporations
addressing the wider financial, environmental, and social impact of
all that a company does. It entails minimizing the negative effects
of the actions of a company and maximizing the positive ones on
stakeholders as well as on the communities in which the enterprise
operates and the governments with which it must work.109
It involves how a corporation responds to the expectations of all of its
stakeholders, as opposed to just shareholders;110 that is, how it responds to
and recognizes the needs of all of the organizations and individuals that are
in any way affected by its actions, including shareholders, owners,
105.
106.
107.

See Steinberg & Powell, supra note 94, at 1.
See Battilana et al., supra note 10, at 52.
See Schwab, supra note 14, at 110. See also NETWORK FOR BUS. INNOVATION AND
SUSTAINABILITY, B RESOURCE GUIDE: CREATING A CODE OF ETHICS 2 (2007), available at
http://nbis.org/nbisresources/human_resources/howto_create_employee_code_ethics_corp.pdf (defining
a corporate code of ethics as “a formal document that establishes behavioral expectations for the
company and the people who work there”); Mark Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship Between
Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behaviour, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 247, 248 (2001) (stating that corporate
codes of ethics can be used for a variety of reasons, “including the provision of consistent normative
standards for employees, avoidance of legal consequences, and promotion of public image”). See also
Lisa Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility
Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 773–78 (2007) (discussing the ubiquity and utility of corporate codes of
conduct).
108.
See Schwab, supra note 14, at 112.
109.
See id. at 112–13.
110.
Amy J. Hillman & Gerald D. Keim, Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Management, and
Social Issues: What’s the Bottom Line?, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 125, 126 (2001) (explaining that
capital suppliers are shareholders, and that stakeholders include shareholders as well as employees,
customers, and community residents, among others). For an overview of the history and development of
the field, see Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207
(2002).
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employees, investors, suppliers, clients and consumers. It is measured by
“triple bottom-line accountability”111 whereby “a company reports not only
on its financial results but also on what it is doing and what it is not doing
in meeting stakeholder expectations” of its obligations to society.112
Social entrepreneurship refers to firms or organizations that “integrate
philanthropy into their business models at a more basic [or fundamental]
level than companies” that focus on corporate contributions or act in
accordance with corporate social responsibility norms.113 By contrast,
“[s]ocial entrepreneurs pursue social and business goals together, viewing
them as synergistic and mutually reinforcing . . . . This deep and particular
commitment to philanthropic endeavor is the thrust of the social enterprise
ideal.”114 Moreover, ideally social entrepreneurs do not simply redeploy

111.
For more in-depth definitions and discussions of triple bottom-line accountability, see Nancy
J. King & Brian J. King, Creating Incentives for Sustainable Buildings: A Comparative Law Approach
Featuring the United States and European Union, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 400–01 n.6 (2005) (“The
‘triple bottom line’ definition of sustainability creates measures of an organization’s sustainable
performance and reports on how the organization impacts economic, environmental and social issues”
(citing JOHN ELKINGTON, THE CHRYSALIS ECONOMY 11–12 (2001))). See also Paulette L. Stenzel, Free
Trade and Sustainability Through the Lens of Nicaragua: How CAFTA-DR Should Be Amended to
Promote the Triple Bottom Line, 34 WM. & MARY. ENVTL. L. REV. 653, 664–66 (2010) (“In recent
years, business managers, business professors, and environmentalists have begun to label this pursuit
the ‘Triple Bottom Line.’ This concept, coined by John Elkington, ‘challenges companies to look not
merely at the economic or profit aspect of their business but also at the environmental and social costs:
“At its narrowest, the term ‘[T]riple [B]ottom [L]ine’ is used as a framework for measuring and
reporting corporate performance against economic, social and environmental parameters. At its
broadest, the term is used to capture the whole set of values, issues and processes that companies must
address in order to minimize any harm resulting from their activities and to create economic, social and
environmental value.”’ The Triple Bottom Line gives businesses a tool to help measure whether their
actions promote sustainable development. . . . Although businesspeople like to enumerate benefits of
their efforts, it is not possible to quantify all facets of the Triple Bottom Line. Nevertheless, businesses
can use a variety of tools to analyze whether they are addressing and balancing all three legs of the
Triple Bottom Line.” (internal citations omitted)).
112.
Schwab, supra note 14, at 113. See James A. Phills Jr., Kriss Deiglmeier, & Dale T. Miller,
Rediscovering Social Innovation, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Fall 2008, at 35, 36 (discussing the
concept of social innovation as being larger than just the pursuit of profits, and defining social
innovation as “[a] novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just
than existing solutions and for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather
than private individuals” (emphasis omitted)); see also Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social
Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1351–52 (2011)
(noting that there is no widely accepted definition for corporate social responsibility, but that fair wages
and service to the public are generally included).
113.
See Reiser, supra note 17, at 2450.
114.
Id. See also LAURA MICHELINI, CORPORATE SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND NEW
BUSINESS MODELS CREATING SHARED VALUE IN LOW-INCOME MARKETS 21 (2012) (“The definition
of a social enterprise refers to the tangible outcome of social entrepreneurship. Hence, when we talk
about social entrepreneurship, we refer to the process that invests in private people who are oriented to
pursue opportunity and are satisfying unmeet [sic] social needs. If this same process is applied to the
business sector, we should refer to it as corporate social entrepreneurship . . . . The fundamental purpose
of CSE is to accelerate companies’ organizational transformations into more powerful generators of
societal betterment. CSE is not another form of CSR but rather is a process for invigorating and
advancing the development of CSR.”); WAYNE VISSER ET AL., THE A TO Z OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
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business skills and tools to build enterprises to solve social problems; their
greatest strengths are not necessarily found in the way they build ventures
to deliver products or services, but “in the way they connect people in new
configurations and, in so doing, help people work together more
effectively, influencing their career or life pathways.”115 Viewed from this
perspective, hybrids cannot fully support or define the range of social
entrepreneurship now emerging, as will be discussed infra. Consequently,
the above discussion is meant to show that simply concentrating on or
creating hybrid forms is not sufficient to allow the for the full range of
social entrepreneurship now occurring; that is, we must create a broader
regulatory environment to fully capture both the philanthropic innovations
now emerging and the potential for more creative forms to emerge in the
United States.
For-profit/non-profit hybrids (again, also called for-profit
philanthropies) seek to go even further than corporate social philanthropy.
They seek to create for-profit companies “tasked solely with pursuing
philanthropy . . . [while their] core business remains primarily devoted to
profit maximization.”116 In their ideal form, managers do not face conflicts
or choices between mission and profit, as these are supposed to be fully
integrated into the organization’s primary strategy. In addition, the
integration of social and commercial value creation is supposed to create “a
virtuous cycle of profit and reinvestment in the social mission” of the
organization.117 In essence, then, the term “for-profit social enterprise” (or
simply “social enterprise”) refers to businesses with shareholder-owners
that seek to address social problems by combining the dynamism of
capitalized for-profit enterprise with the intentionally pro-social orientation
of non-profit organizations.118 These hybrids seek to exploit the regulatory
benefits of both for-profit and non-profit forms by giving up the traditional
tax benefits for non-profit organizations in exchange for the control over
profits for-profit firms maintain. As I have argued before in my previous
work, hybrid organizations are also freed from the legal restrictions on
commercial activity and accountability that apply to non-profit entities,

RESPONSIBILITY: A COMPLETE REFERENCE GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, CODES AND ORGANISATIONS 118
(2008) (“A corporate social entrepreneur is a person who innovatively employs market forces, including
new business ventures, to address or solve social or environmental problems.”); David Bornstein, The
Rise of the Social Entrepreneur, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Nov. 13, 2012, 9:30 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/the-rise-of-social-entrepreneur/ (noting that social
entrepreneurs are not just “businesspeople solving social ills, but people spreading new approaches—
through nonprofits and businesses, or within government—to address problems more successfully than
in the past”).
115.
Bornstein, supra note 114.
116.
See Reiser, supra note 17, at 2452.
117.
Battilana et al., supra note 10, at 52.
118.
Page & Katz, supra note 112, at 1353.
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while at the same time, unlike most for-profit firms, they are also freed to
focus on social returns over economic returns.119
Hybrid entities thus “combine social mission with commercial
activities” in innovative ways, but also “create unfamiliar combinations of
activities for which a supportive [legal or regulatory] ecosystem may not
yet exist.”120 This means that currently hybrid structures are operating in a
conceptual and regulatory no-man’s-land where the constraints and
accountability mechanisms that apply to both non-profit and for-profit
entities do not apply, and where their activities may be regulated only by
the good intentions of their founders and managers, or in extreme cases, by
resort to fraud claims or criminal penalties.121
These gaps in the regulatory structures applicable to hybrid entities
constitute a significant legal void that is both under-theorized122 and, this
Article argues, under-appreciated. This Article seeks to demonstrate why
legal action is urgently needed to fill this void.
The boundaries between each of these sectors and entities are now
blurring in a variety of ways that are little-understood.123 Moreover, much
of the regulatory and scholarly attempts to address this legal void have
been conducted in a piecemeal fashion, suggesting incremental legislative
changes or focusing on defining what hybrid entities are and how they
operate.124
For instance, founders of hybrid entities currently have two options in
the United States. First, they can choose to either structure themselves

119.
Rana, supra note 3, at 93.
120.
Battilana et al., supra note 10, at 51.
121.
See Rana, supra note 3, at 95.
122.
See Reiser, supra note 17, at 2473.
123.
Id.; see also Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies that Profit, but Can Tap
Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/business/a-quest-for-hybridcompanies-part-money-maker-part-nonprofit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Unlike a straight nonprofit
group, these businesses can tap into conventional capital markets as well as philanthropy. And unlike a
for-profit corporation, the structure allows investors to emphasize the social mission over making
money, and to be supported by money from foundations.”). See also Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing
and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 619, 619 (2010) (the “blurring of the
boundary between for-profit and nonprofit has gone on for years and appears only to be gaining
steam.”).
124.
See Strom, supra note 123 (indicating that much of the legislation on these hybrid
companies is being done at the state level). See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing:
Flexible Purpose Corporations, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 55, 83 (2012) (“We do not yet know if the FPC
[flexible purpose corporation], or any other specialized form for social enterprise, will break out of the
pack and become ‘the next big thing.’ All of these forms are novel, and it will be some time before
many of their provisions are interpreted and their usefulness is determined.”). This article also presents
an informative description of the legal structures underlying flexible purpose corporations and their
implications. See also Steven Munch, Note, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional
Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
170 (2012) (suggesting ways policymakers and entrepreneurs may improve the new benefit corporation
model).
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legally as a non-profit or for-profit organization. This forces founders to
claim the organizational benefits of only one of these forms. As an
example,
a hybrid that registers as a nonprofit cannot access equity capital
markets because it cannot legally sell ownership stakes to
investors. But if a hybrid incorporates as a for-profit, it cannot offer
the same tax benefits to [its] donors as registered nonprofits can,
even if these approaches lead to the most effective social
solution.125
Thus, traditional legal barriers have compelled organizations seeking
both profits and social good to nurture one purpose at the expense of the
other.126 Furthermore, legal barriers have forced organizations to either
conform to the rigid for-profit organizational structure, where the financial
and fiduciary duties owed to shareholders effectively subverted the
organization’s goal of promoting social good,127 or force the organization to
adopt a non-profit structure, in which case the restrictions imposed upon
the organization from distributing profits undermine their profit-seeking
purpose.128 “Further complicating the choice is the reality that
entrepreneurs cannot fully anticipate their future resource needs at the time
legal registration choices are made, and thus risk being prematurely locked
in to one sector or the other.”129
Alternatively, founders of hybrid entities can choose to legally
structure their organizations through some of the new regulatory structures
that are emerging around the hybrid hype. These structures also contain
both strengths and limitations, as will be discussed below.
It is also important to note here that the lines between for-profit,
government, and non-profit firms often blur as these entities compete in the
marketplace. For example, there are many markets in which non-profit
service providers operate alongside for-profit and government providers.130
The market for childcare centers in the United States illustrates this
blurring of sectors; for instance, day-care centers in the United States are
divided so that approximately 60% are organized as non-profits, with the

125.
Battilana et al., supra note 10, at 52.
126.
Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV.
105, 106 (2010).
127.
J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement,
Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1, 14 (2011).
128.
Id. at 9.
129.
See Battilana et al., supra note 10, at 52.
130.
See THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 151.
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remaining 40% operating as for-profit organizations, and some of the nonprofits operating with government entities in pursuit of common goals. 131
2. Hybrids: Hype or Hope for Future Reform?
Recent social and financial pressures have increased attention on the
potential of hybrid entities. Over the last few decades, and sharpened by the
recent financial crisis, there has been considerable debate over how
businesses can “do better”—that is, better in a social or charitable sense.132
Considerable debate has also centered on the sustainability of philanthropic
enterprises—that is, how can philanthropic entities become largely or fully
self-sufficient, or render their causes or aims self-sustaining?133 Recently,
some of this debate has centered on the idea of the social enterprise—an
enterprise operated for socially beneficial ends.134 From these debates

131.
Id. at 151–52. This market for competition between forms of charitable operations has been
often studied, to determine the optimal mix of these models in a given market. See id. at 151–56. A
closer look at this debate, while richly illuminating, is beyond the scope of this paper.
132.
See generally Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 753, 755 (2011) (“Lately, however, private foundations have become the target of those seeking
to harness the power of ‘market-based’ innovation, as a sort of new technology, to contribute to the
project of smarter philanthropy.”).
133.
The U.K. Charity Commission has included “financial sustainability” and “diversification”
of sources of income as hallmark of effective charities. U.K. CHARITY COMM’N, THE HALLMARKS OF
AN EFFECTIVE CHARITY (July 2008), available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/
guidance/cc10text.pdf [hereinafter U.K. CHARITY COMM’N] (“Hallmark 5 . . . ensures financial
sustainability by managing cash flow and monitoring and reviewing financial performance during the
year, taking timely corrective action where needed; considers the sources of its income and has a
strategy in place to raise the funds it needs—diversifying its sources of income as far as possible . . . .”);
see also Marilyn Struthers, Supporting Financial Vibrancy in the Quest for Sustainability in the NotFor-Profit Sector, 19 THE PHILANTHROPIST 241, 241 (2004) (“The quest for sustainability in voluntary
sector organizations is a quest for sense in a rapidly changing funding world and a turbulent economic
environment. Interest in the concept of sustainability by both funders and leaders of nonprofit
organizations is mounting as the sector moves more deeply into what may be termed a funding
crisis . . . .”); But see Brian D. Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213 (2010) (arguing
against the Eric Posner article about for-profit charities and promoting the traditional position of
charities); Robert C. DeGaudenzi, Tax-Exempt Public Charities: Increasing Accountability and
Compliance, 36 CATH. LAW. 203 (1995–1996) (noting criticism of charity misconduct and proposing
increased IRS disclosure of financial information where abuse is detected).
134.
See generally Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and
International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291 (2010); Katz & Page, supra note 17; Janet E.
Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business Judgment Rule
Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623 (2007);
Malani & Posner, supra note 17; Page & Katz, supra note 112; Linda O. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity:
The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3 (2010); Astrid
Coates & Wim Van Opstal, The Joys and Burdens of Multiple Legal Frameworks for Social
Entrepreneurship—Lessons from the Belgian Case (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper No.
WP-SCE 09-03, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1432427; Levinus Timmerman, Matthijs
De Jongh & Alexander Schild, The Rise of the Social Enterprise: How Social Enterprises Are Changing
Company Law Worldwide, in THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 305 (S. Muller et al.
eds., 2011), available at http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_11_Web.pdf.
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another theme has emerged—that philanthropy itself could be improved.
Hence, “philanthrocapitalists,” among the richest technology elite of our
time:135
believe they are improving philanthropy, equipping it to tackle the
new set of problems facing today’s changing world; and to be
blunt, it needs improvement—much philanthropy over the
centuries has been ineffective. They think they can do a better job
than their predecessors. The past couple of decades have been a
golden age for capitalism, and today’s new philanthropists are
trying to apply the secrets behind that money-making success to
their giving.136
It is in this atmosphere that hybrid entities have come to be the focus of
regulatory and scholarly attention. Arguably, the philanthropic structure
garnering the most attention today is the “for-profit charity”137—which
seeks to merge market profit motives that purportedly promote innovation
and market discipline with the donative and philanthropic aims of
traditional charities. Such entities have proliferated in the wake of the
recent financial crisis; for example, one study analyzing grant requests to a
large grantor showed that grant requests based on the hybrid model rose
from 37% in 2006 to 50 % in 2010 and 2011.138
Proponents of these hybrid entities argue (and unintentionally echo a
central part of the argument set forth here that commercial entrepreneurship
and philanthropic change are inextricably linked) that “the past couple of
decades have been a golden age for capitalism” and that today’s new

135.
For a description of Bill Gates’s market and philanthropic work, see Brendan Coffee, Gates
Beats Ellison in Daily Ranking of Tech Billionaires, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-07/gates-beats-ellison-in-bloomberg-daily-ranking-oftechnology-billionaires.html, and Beckett, supra note 135. For Sergey Brin’s market and philanthropic
work, see Mark Malseed, The Story of Sergey Brin, MOMENT MAGAZINE, Feb. 2007, at 39. For a
description of Mark Zuckerberg’s work and philanthropic aims, see Robert Peston, Facebook Unveils
$5bn Stock Market Flotation Plans, BBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business16830664.
136.
See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 2–3. The U.K. Charity Commission has included
“financial sustainability” and “diversification” of sources of income as hallmarks of effective charities.
U.K. CHARITY COMM’N, supra note 133.
137.
See Page & Katz, supra note 112, at 1353 (“‘Social enterprise’ is a loose term for businesses
that aim to generate profits while advancing social goals. Proponents of social enterprise believe that
such businesses can combine the dynamism of for-profit firms with the mission-driven zeal more
typical of nonprofit organizations.” (footnote omitted)). See also Reiser, supra note 17, at 2472
(“Google.org’s for-profit philanthropy model is the most recent in a long line of phenomena blending
nonprofit and for-profit endeavor. The persistence of corporate charitable contributions and corporate
social responsibility initiatives, as well as the advent of social enterprise and the new advocates of
philanthrocapitalism, suggest innovation may well continue in this direction.” (footnote omitted)).
138.
See Battilana et al., supra note 10, at 2.
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philanthropists are creatively “trying to apply the secrets behind [their]
money-making success to their giving.”139 The media is awash with
commentators making claims such as “we may even be going through a
new Enlightenment” and basing this high-flying rhetoric on “[t]he [r]ise of
the Social Entrepreneur[s]” and their novel ideas.140 Legislatures and
businesses have bought into the hype over the transformative nature of the
public-private hybrid structure, to the extent that state after state has
created special structures for the formation of hybrid for-profit entities.141
Several new regulatory and corporate structures have been proposed
and implemented to foster hybrid entities. These structures, focused on
similar aims, are discussed and categorized below.
3. Hybrid Structures Emerging Across the United States
One hybrid form is the Low-Profit Limited Liability Corporation
(L3C), which is a variant of the traditional LLC, with three additional
requirements. First, an L3C must have been established to carry out a
charitable or educational purpose.142 Second, income or property
appreciation cannot be significant goals of the L3C.143 Third, the L3C is
prohibited from engaging in most political activities in the same manner as
are conventional non-profit organizations.144

139.
BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 2–3. Most philanthrocapitalists focus on the profit motive
or management skills as the driver behind their money-making success. Id. However, this Article argues
that the most successful philanthropic entrepreneurship relies on harnessing technological and
commercial innovations beyond that of the profit motive and business management skills.
140.
See Bornstein, supra note 114. Bornstein is also the author of HOW TO CHANGE THE
WORLD: SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS AND THE POWER OF NEW IDEAS (2007) and a co-author of SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2010).
141.
Many states are in the process of creating corporate structures to support forprofit/philanthropy hybrids. See Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State Series: L3C & B Corporation Legislation
Table, (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 10-11, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1561783.
142.
Reiser, supra note 123, at 621 (“An L3C must ‘significantly further the accomplishment of
one or more charitable or educational purposes’ under the federal tax code. The enabling legislation
typically also issues a kind of negative command, requiring that a company ‘would not have been
formed but for the company’s relationship to the accomplishment of’ those purposes.” (footnote
omitted)). Vermont first introduced the L3C in 2008, with Rhode Island, Louisiana, Illinois, North
Carolina, Maine, Michigan, Utah and Wyoming rapidly following suit. See Dana Brakman Reiser,
Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 593
(2011).
143.
Reiser, supra note 123, at 621 (“Next, the statutes require that neither income production nor
property appreciation may be a significant purpose of an L3C, and some require this to be stated in the
L3C’s formative documents.”).
144.
Id. (“Finally, each statute specifically disallows L3Cs from pursuing purposes that would
disqualify an entity from exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)’s limitations on lobbying and political
campaign activity.”).
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Another hybrid form is the For-Benefit Corporation (B Corporation), a
private regulatory model self-imposed by a conventional corporation.145
This model produces no tax advantages.146 Existing B Corporation
standards impose particularly high obligations on directors to consider the
social purposes of the corporation.147 Some states have adopted legislation
establishing B Corporations into their state corporate laws, most
significantly California,148 Maryland149 and Hawaii.150 As we have seen in
corporate law generally, those wishing to take advantage of a particular
corporate structure will flock to a state or states that allows it, potentially
rendering the laws of other states almost superfluous.151
Thus, individuals seeking to blend philanthropy with market
mechanisms have a variety of structural choices available, choices that
appear to be only increasing over time, as will be discussed below.
B. The Current Status of Hybrid Legislation and the Debates over Hybrid
Entities
1. American States
The law of philanthropic structures, and the ways in which publicprivate entities can be created, is in a state of flux. As of July 10, 2012,
145.
Id. at 637 (“A B corporation . . . uses the traditional, state-law-governed corporate form as
its base. This base is then varied through statements amending an individual corporation’s organic
documents to commit it to ‘use[] the power of business to solve social and environmental problems.’”
(footnotes omitted)).
146.
Id. at 637–38 (“As a private certification system, the B corporation designation offers no
special tax treatment for corporations that obtain it. Ordinary federal and state income and property
taxes will apply regardless of B certification . . . .”). Maryland pioneered the B Corporation in 2010,
and was quickly followed by California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and Vermont. See B
CORPORATION,
2012
ANNUAL
REPORT
8
(2012),
available
at
http://www.bcorporation.net/storage/documents/BcorpAP2012_Web-Version.pdf
[hereinafter
B
CORPORATION].
147.
Reiser, supra note 123, at 640 (“[U]nder the required charter amendments, a New York B
Corporation director would be obliged to go further . . . [and] be commanded to consider these outside
interests. Moreover, the range of outside interests she must consider is even broader than that described
by the statute, including abstract social and environmental concerns.” (footnote omitted)).
148.
See B CORPORATION, supra note 146.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractrarians, Waiver of
Liability Provisions, and the Race to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 314 (2009) (“The evidence is
consistent with a race to the bottom. The waiver of liability provisions were not designed to solve a
corporate governance problem, but were intended to benefit management. Because management
controls the reincorporation process, they could move the company to Delaware to take advantage of
reduced liability.”). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance,
95 VA. L. REV. 685, 686 (2009) (“The dominant academic view was that Delaware had waged and won
a ‘race for the bottom’ in corporate law by offering ever-more-favorable terms to managers, who then
moved their corporations to that lax jurisdiction.”).
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nine states had adopted L3C statutes: Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.152 Nine
states—California, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia—have adopted B-Corporations,
with Maryland adopting two forms—the B-Corp and the BLLC.153
In addition, L3C legislation is pending in Alabama, Arizona,
California, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York,
Oklahoma, and Virginia.154 Also, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania are currently considering the
formation of B Corporations.155
Only time will tell how useful or successful these legislative
changes will be, though they clearly reflect the transformation taking place
today regarding corporate structures and philanthropy.
2. International Comparisons
Tellingly, these sweeping corporate and philanthropic changes are
occurring on an international level as well. In the United Kingdom, the
Community Interest Company (CIC) is a new special status within UK

152.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-5 (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301(West
2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 1502 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4102(2)(m)(West
2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-2-21(West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-16-2 (West 2012);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-102 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 3001 (West 2010); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 17-29-102 (West 2011). See Bishop, supra note 141.
153.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2 (West 2011); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:1803 (2012); MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (West 2012); MD. CODE.
ANN. CORPS & ASS’NS § 4A-1101 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011); N.Y. BUS.
CORP. § 1702 (McKinney 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-120 (2012) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A
§ 21.03 (West 2012); VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-782 (West 2011). See Bishop, supra note 141.
154.
Alabama (S.B. 517, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011)); Arizona (S.B. 1503, 50th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2011)); California (S.B. 323, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011)); Connecticut (S.B. 403,
2012 Feb. Sess.(Conn. 2012); Georgia (H.B. 594, 151st Gen. Assemb. (Ga. 2011)); Hawaii (S.B. 674 &
H.B. 2082, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011)); Iowa (S.F. 158, 85th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011));
Indiana (S.B. 501, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011)); Kentucky (H.B. 110, 2011 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011)); Maryland (H.B. 552 & S.B. 209, 428th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011));
Massachusetts (H.B. 1868, 187th Gen Ct. (Mass. 2011)); Minnesota (S.B. 2063, 87th Leg. Sess., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2012)); Missouri (H.B. 1561, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.2012)); New
Hampshire (S.B. 352, 162d Leg. Sess. (N.H. 2012)); New York (S.B. 3011& A.B. 6116, 234th Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2011)); Oklahoma (H.B. 1088, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2011)); Virginia (S.B. 351, 2012
Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012)). See Bishop, supra note 141.
155.
Colorado (S.B. 182, 68th General Assemb. 2d Reg. Sess. (Co. 2012)); Florida (H.B. 757,
114th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)); Illinois (S.B. 2897, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Illinois 2011)); Iowa (H.F. 2154,
84th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2011)); Michigan (S.B. 359, S.B. 360, H.B. 4616, and H.B. 4615,
96th Leg. Sess. (Mich. 2011)); Minnesota (S.F. 1572, 87th Leg. Sess., 2d Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011));
New York (S.B. 79, 234th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011)); North Carolina (S.B. 26, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2011)); Pennsylvania (H.B. 1578 and S.B. 433, 159th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2011)); South
Carolina (S.B. 1405, 119th Session General Assemb. (S.C. 2011)). See Bishop, supra note 141.
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company law, having the structure of a conventional limited company, but
regulated by the CIC Regulator.156 CICs receive no automatic tax
benefits.157 CICs are subject to restrictions on their disposal of assets.158
Other European countries are also developing their own versions of
social entrepreneurship or socially beneficial companies, generally
following the lead of the United States. One author characterized this trend
by noting that “[w]hile Americans now tend to stress the ‘blurred
boundaries’ among institutional and legal forms as well as the ‘blended
value creation’ (profits alongside social value) that characterizes social
entrepreneurship, Europeans rather stress the fact that social
entrepreneurship most often takes place within the ‘third sector’ (i.e., the
private, not-for-profit sector).”159 While taking different approaches, many
European countries have begun developing legal structures and statutory
support for social enterprises.160
This contrasts with the situation in the United States, where much of
the debate over philanthropic innovation has focused on the tax status of
philanthropic entities.161 For example, in one area of current debate, Anup
Malani and Eric Posner have identified entrepreneurs’ desire to take or give
a share of profit to employees, instead of a wage, as the motivation for a
move from non-profit to for-profit organizations.162 Thomas Kelley
identifies the legal issues facing traditionally formed non-profits engaging

156.
Reiser, supra note 123, at 630–31 (“The actual content of the CIC enactment is relatively
thin, relying on company law as the basic framework for the new form, though supplying more details
than do the L3C statutes. This enactment delegates continuing rulemaking and supervision for CICs to a
light touch, dedicated CIC Regulator.”).
157.
Id. at 631 (“In the area of taxation, CIC status does not confer any benefits beyond those
available to other UK companies.”).
158.
Id. at 634–35 (“A CIC’s assets are subject to an ‘asset lock.’ This asset lock prohibits a CIC
from disposing of assets for consideration of less than their fair market value, except in pursuit of the
community benefits the CIC is designed to pursue or in a transfer to a charity or another CIC.” (footnote
omitted)).
159.
Social Enterprise in Europe: Recent Trends and Developments 5 (Jacques Defourny &
Marthe Nyssens eds.) (European Research Network WP no. 08/01).
160.
Id.
161.
See generally DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON NONPROFITS
UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL 116–25 (2010) (arguing that charities should be allowed access to
institutional for-profit investment and that reform will help charities raise crucial funding, beyond what
donations, loans, and fees for services can provide.); see also Malani & Posner, supra note 17 (arguing
that charities should be permitted to raise capital by promising investors a financial return.). Cf. Galle,
supra note 133 (arguing against the Eric Posner article about for-profit charities and promoting the
traditional view of charities).
162.
Malani & Posner, supra note 17, at 2019 (“Perhaps the entrepreneur is very talented and
could make a great deal of money at a noncharitable start-up company. She would have to turn that
income down to form a charity, and while the entrepreneur is kind-hearted, she also cares about
maintaining a comfortable lifestyle. Or perhaps the entrepreneur and donors believe she cannot
motivate her employees to work hard unless she can offer them a share of the firm’s profits.”).
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in innovative approaches to funding.163 In essence, the debate has been
largely cast as one based on a set of tax questions or corporate form
questions.164
As one group of scholars put it, due to the spaces left by a relatively
weak charities law165 and the public and private failures of many nonprofits that are “far from perfect, at times deploying their resources in ways
that fail to advance the public good,” there is room to debate a radical
policy reform in which charitable operations alone would define which
organizations might receive the benefits of favorable policy treatment.
With such a reform, or with an enabling policy of regulatory flexibility
along these lines, the provision of charitable services would be the sole
criterion for tax and other benefits regardless of organizational status. Such
a reform, therefore, would permit for-profit firms to receive tax deductions
to the extent that they used these funds for specified charitable purposes,
and would deny tax deductions to nonprofit organizations to the extent that
they did not use the funds for charitable purposes.166
These same issues are often cast as a different set of policy
questions—whether nonprofit organizations merit their special tax
status and, if they do, whether specific charitable acts should be
required of organizations that enjoy these tax benefits. Once tax
benefits are contingent on specific acts, it is a short step to
contemplate permitting entities that do not qualify as nonprofit
organizations to enjoy the benefits available to non-profits, at least
insofar as they engage in charitable activities.167

163.
Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 337, 343 n.20 (2009) [hereinafter Kelly, Law and Choice of Entity] (“The two topics—legal
problems faced by nonprofits that engage in entrepreneurial, profit-generating activity and the growing
phenomenon of for-profit organizations forming to pursue essentially social benefit missions—are
closely and even causally linked.”). See generally Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A
Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437 (2005)
[hereinafter Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity].
164.
See Hines et al., supra note 14, at 1181.
165.
See Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 190 (“The founders of modern American philanthropy
tried to provide answers to problems that were national in scope, at a time when national governments
were weak. Today’s philanthropists have a chance to address problems that are global in scope, at a
time when global institutions are even weaker.” (internal citations omitted)).
166.
See Hines et al., supra note 14, at 1181.
167.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Steven J. Haymore, Public(ly oriented) Companies: B
Corporations and the Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311 (2011);
Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity, supra note 163; Murray & Hwang, supra note 127. Again, while
providing valuable insights, these articles fail to recognize the links and nexus between purely
commercial entrepreneurial entities and charitable endeavors.
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3. Hybrid Failures
In addition to this scholarly debate on the forms and possibilities of
hybrids, it is also worth noting that many, even some of the most heralded,
for-profit/non-profit hybrid entities have failed. This Article argues that
these failures arose in part because they placed form over innovation, and
failed to focus on the structural financial or commercial innovations that
had already proven successful in the for-profit market.
Perhaps the most widely discussed failure is that of Google.org. Its
parent company Google.com, has itself has been described as a gamechanger, a revolutionary firm that has changed the landscape of the internet
and society, one that has repeatedly reinvented businesses for a new
information age.168 When Google.com first announced these plans, in my
prior writings I predicted that its philanthropic endeavors were unlikely to
succeed unless they focused on the technologies that made Google.com
uniquely successful and revolutionized the search-engine market.169
Interestingly, this appears to be exactly what happened. When
Google.com went public, it did so with a philanthropic twist: Google’s
founders’ announced that they were establishing a foundation that would be
funded by approximately one percent of Google’s profits and equity.170
After the highly successful IPO, Google chose to create not a traditional
foundation, but a foundation with a for-profit philanthropy, a hybrid entity
with charitable aims but for-profit status.171
In this manner, Google took on philanthropy, intending to once again
be a revolutionizing game-changer. In the years immediately following its
IPO, Google began to heavily publicize its great ambitions to reshape the
philanthropic landscape by creating Google.org, an arm of the for-profit
public company whose shareholders would expect a financial return.172
After great initial hype, Google.org suffered several notable failures
(such as a failed attempt to accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles—
168.
James Fallows, How to Save the News, THE ATLANTIC, June 2010, at 45 (also discussing
how Google intends to reshape the news media).
169.
See Rana, supra note 3 (predicting Google.org’s demise).
170.
See id.; see also Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 27 (Aug. 18, 2004)
(“Google is not a conventional company. We do not intend to become one. Throughout Google’s
evolution as a privately held company, we have managed Google differently. We have also emphasized
an atmosphere of creativity and challenge, which has helped us provide unbiased, accurate and free
access to information for those who rely on us around the world.”).
171.
See Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google’s Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006,
at A1; see also Rana, supra note 3, at 87–88 n.6 (“‘Google.org is the philanthropic arm of Google and is
the umbrella which includes the work of the Google Foundation, some of Google’s own projects, as
well as partnerships and contributions to for-profit and non-profit entities’” (quoting the 2007 “About
Us” page for Google.org). See also Robin Rogers-Dillon, Nonprofit Stock Markets and Social
Citizenship, SOCIETY, Mar./Apr. 2007, at 35 (citing Google.org as a for-profit model of philanthropy).
172.
See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 174.
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this is an example of philanthropically aimed projects Google.org began
experimenting with, but ones that increasingly moved further and further
away from Google.com’s core technologies and the technologies
underlying both Google.com’s successes and it unique contributions to
search engine technologies).173 Not surprisingly, after these failures,
Google recently revamped its philanthropic arm and limited its work to
applying Google’s search engines to charitable endeavors.174 Its other
attempts at for-profit philanthropic endeavors either failed or have been
abandoned.175 While Google once hoped the novel form of Google.org
would allow it to “play on the entire keyboard,” including starting
companies, building industries, paying consultants, give money to
individuals and make a profit,176 Google.org was eventually forced to
sharply narrow its ambitions and projects. That is, “DotOrg has narrowed
to just one octave on the piano: engineering-related projects that often are
the outgrowth of existing Google products.”177
Significantly, Google’s most successful philanthropic project has been
the one where it applied the innovations underlying its commercial success
to its philanthropy—in essence, applying its data search and analysis
techniques towards philanthropic ends, specifically to promote public
health or emergency response projects. This success is actually the result of
a crossroads Google.org faced as many of its hyped philanthropic attempts
failed to deliver (such as an initiative to support more efficient cars).178
The story behind is shift also offers significant lessons for hybrid
entities. When faced with problems in its DotOrg entity, Google was forced
to confront two competing ideas:
The first was a Googley idea that DotOrg would completely
reinvent philanthropy and, in doing so, reinvent the world and
address a hugely important set of problems with solutions only
Google with its immense intellectual talent and resources could
find.

173.
174.

Id.
See Stephanie Strom & Miguel Helft, Google Finds It Hard to Reinvent Philanthropy, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/business/30charity.html.
175.
Id.
176.
See Hafner, supra note 171 (explaining that Google’s founders “believe for-profit status will
greatly increase their philanthropy’s range and flexibility” and also citing Google.org’s Executive
Director, Dr. Larry Brilliant, who notes that unlike corporate foundations with a traditional non-profit
structure, “Google.org can play on the entire keyboard” and “can start companies, build industries, pay
consultants, lobby, give money to individuals and make a profit”).
177.
Strom & Helft, supra note 174; see also Milbrandt, supra note 17 (discussing the Google.org
project at some length).
178.
Strom & Helft, supra note 174.
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. . . The second idea . . . was more modest: “that DotOrg could
make some headway, maybe a little, maybe a lot, in addressing
these really big problems by doing what Google as a company is
really good at doing, which is to say, aggregating information.”179
Significantly, the “second idea . . . won out.”180 This meant that
Google.org turned to philanthropic efforts which drew upon and
implemented its searching and data gathering capabilities. Google.org now
concedes this on its current website, which in contrast to its earlier, more
ambitious stated goals, now states that “[w]e focus on problems where
Google’s assets and core capabilities—technology innovation, global
presence, making massive amounts information universally accessible and
useful—play strongest and where the solutions we create have the most
potential to scale.”181
Thus, the projects Google.org now successfully promotes are those that
explicitly harness its core business and unique technology. For example,
Google.org developed a tool called Google Flu Trends, which used data
collected from searches about flu symptoms to predict the location of flu
outbreaks and provide early warning systems.
Hurricane Sandy provides another interesting and key example of
Google’s philanthropic shift. When Hurricane Sandy hit the eastern United
States at the end of October 2012, Google introduced a program called
Public Alerts, intended to publicize warnings about natural disasters and
emergencies based on information from government agencies and the
National Weather Service.182 The alerts show up, among other places, in
response to searches on Google.com and Google Maps.183 These examples
offer some evidence that new philanthropic entities can achieve more
impact by harnessing key technological developments for philanthropic
ends rather than moving towards utilizing a for-profit/non-profit hybrid
structure (or even moving to new structures without seeking to harness the
technologies that led to the original company’s success).
Other hybrid entities have simply failed because of structural problems
or problems merging for-profit and non-profit ideologies, structures, and

179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
See About Us, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google.org/about.html (last visited May 9, 2013);
cf. the earlier website described supra note 171.
182.
Claire Cain Miller, Google Introduces New Emergency Resources in Response to Sandy,
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Oct. 30, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/googleintroduces-new-emergency-resources-in-response-to-sandy/?ref=business.
183.
Id.
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goals. One notable failure of a hybrid project was that of Shorebank.184
Another failed hybrid is the microfinance organization created by BancoSol
for microfinance provision to non-traditional users. This organization
switched from a traditional non-profit form to a hybrid organization, but
was unable to achieve its goals because its employees from non-profit
backgrounds and its employees with for-profit backgrounds were unable to
integrate their missions or work together—a failure of melding
organizational cultures.185 Another notable failure is that of Aspire—a
British social franchise that ultimately collapsed because “it paired a weak
business model with ambitious social objectives.”186
Such failures have spawned calls for reform and greater sustainability
and accountability mechanisms for the new hybrid entities.187
“Philanthrocapitalists” and hybrid entities have been further criticized for
their failure to deliver real results and a failure to produce “hard evidence
that these new approaches are any better at reducing poverty and injustice
than the governments, foundations, and civil society groups that have been
working away more quietly in the background.”188 These calls for reform
and evidence have taken on a greater urgency as global financial crises
intensify:
The quest for sustainability in voluntary sector organizations is
a quest for sense in a rapidly changing funding world and a
turbulent economic environment. Interest in the concept of
sustainability by both funders and leaders of nonprofit
organizations is mounting as the sector moves more deeply into
what may be termed a funding crisis . . . .189

184.
See generally James Post & Fiona Wilson, Too Good to Fail, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.,
Fall 2011, at 66. For a discussion of other failures, see generally Duncan Scott, Black Boxes in the
Wreckage? Making Sense of Failure in the Third Sector Social Enterprise (Third Sector Research Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 31, Feb. 2010), available at http://www.tsrc.ac.uk/Research/SocialEnterprise/
BlackBoxesmakingsenseoffailure/tabid/644/Default.aspx (discussing a case study of the failure of a
social enterprise in the U.K. and citing studies of five further examples globally).
185.
Battilana et al., supra note 10, at 54.
186.
WILLIE CHENG, DOING GOOD WELL 190 (2009).
187.
See generally John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141 (2010) (“Seemingly,
then, the L3C as a hybrid of both forms can be construed as espousing ultimate theories, purposes, and
fiduciary duties of both for-profit and exempt organizations, thereby appearing to engender conflict
among irreconcilable interests. Such conflict could paralyze decision-making or be so permissive as to
render manager accountability almost meaningless. However, the L3C statutes clearly impose an
unambiguous ordering of fiduciary priorities . . . .”).
188.
EDWARDS, supra note 8, at xii.
189.
Struthers, supra note 133, at 241 (internal citations omitted). For an interesting discussion of
how the United Kingdom has tried to increase sustainability and accountability for socially responsible
businesses, see U.K. CHARITY COMM’N, supra note 133 (explaining that the U.K. Charity Commission
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These critiques and calls for reform are occurring against a backdrop of
great transformations in the nature of capitalism itself.190 In summary:
[T]he business-is-best philosophy remains a powerful and
seductive hook. It promises to supply a new magic bullet that
removes the messiness of social change, and a route to doing good
for others while doing well for yourself without any of the
sacrifices that have been necessary for progress in the past. That’s
an attractive proposition, and also a dangerous mirage.191
For these reasons, it is important to consider alternatives to the
dominant paradigm in the philanthropic literature. This Article seeks to
move beyond the hype around these hybrid entities, arguing that while
hybrids have achieved some successes, creating greater legal and
regulatory space for hybrid entities is simply not broad enough to
encompass all of the ways that philanthropy is changing, especially
philanthropic entities that are trying to harness the “disruptive” change of
our time—social media and e-philanthropy. It is thus not surprising that
many hybrid entities have thus far failed in achieving their goals, and
significantly, are not able to adequately harness market forces to truly
enhance philanthropic endeavors.192 The existing legal literature has
generally tried to address these failures in a piecemeal fashion, either by
pointing to discrete, supposedly correctable failures in the hybrid endeavors
or by claiming that incremental legislative changes or more regulatory
innovation are needed to enhance organization structures.193

has included “financial sustainability” and “diversification” of sources of income as hallmarks of
effective charities: “Hallmark 5 . . . ensures financial sustainability by managing cash flow and
monitoring and reviewing financial performance during the year, taking timely corrective action where
needed; considers the sources of its income and has a strategy in place to raise the funds it needs—
diversifying its sources of income as far as possible . . . .”).
190.
See DOWIE, supra note 6, at xx (“The ambiguous public/private nature of their existence,
which confuses people on both sides of the veil, has prompted more than one observer to describe
foundations as ‘privately organized public institutions.’”). See also Fareed Zakaria, The Capitalist
(Jun.
12,
2009,
8:00
PM),
Manifesto:
Greed
Is
Good,
NEWSWEEK
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/06/12/the-capitalist-manifesto-greed-is-good.html (“A
specter is haunting the world—the return of capitalism. Over the past six months, politicians,
businessmen and pundits have been convinced that we are in the midst of a crisis of capitalism that will
require a massive transformation and years of pain to fix. Nothing will ever be the same again.” Zakaria
also quotes Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner as saying “Capitalism will be different.” He later
concludes that “American capitalism is being rebalanced, reregulated and thus restored. In doing so it
will have to face up to long-neglected problems, if this is to lead to a true recovery, not just a brief
reprieve.”).
191.
EDWARDS, supra note 8, at xi.
192.
See supra Part II.B.3.
193.
See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 3; see also Hines et al., supra note 14. See generally
Battilana et al., supra note 10, at 52–54.
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In light of these critiques, this Article seeks to add to the dominant
legal paradigm by proposing a new lens with which to view philanthropic
innovation. It argues that the new corporate structures states are
developing, discussed above, and the debates over the tax status of nonprofits above, are missing the point by failing to view philanthropic change
from a larger perspective. This Article argues that the most critical
philanthropic innovation of our time does not rest on the typically-framed
and hyped public-private divide, but rather on the firms and entities that are
able to apply the commercial or technological innovations which underlie
their commercial success to the non-profit world. That is, the hype over
hybrids is emblematic of larger changes at play in philanthropy. In other
words, the current hype is not wrong, but is simply too narrowly focused.
Regulatory reform, then, would be most helpful if it centered not on the
hybrid form, but on ways to more broadly harness the technological or
business innovations of our time towards philanthropic ends. As discussed
above, ideally, the new “social entrepreneurs” or philanthrocapitalists are
not merely “redeploy[ing] business skills and tools . . . to solve social
problems,” and their “greatest strength . . . isn’t in the way they build
ventures to deliver products or services,” but their strength lies in the way
they are innovating by, for instance, “connect[ing] people in new
configurations.”194 New regulations, therefore, should be aimed at
supporting these new philanthropic innovations, not just hybrid structures.
III. IDENTIFYING THE KEY PHILANTHROPIC TRANSFORMATIONS
“The word philanthropy literally means ‘love of mankind.’
Philanthropic acts manifest the generosity of the giver.”195
“Billions are wasted on ineffective philanthropy.”196
These quotes, representing two ends of a spectrum, highlight one of the
biggest debates today on the nature, purpose, and efficacy of philanthropy.
Both sides of this spectrum seek change, albeit in different ways—one side
emphasizes the charitable purpose and impact of philanthropic endeavors,
while the other side calls for “fresh thinking” in the form of applying
market and business principles to revitalize the world of philanthropy.197

194.
Bornstein, supra note 114.
195.
Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 190; see also PRINCETON CONFERENCE, supra note 26, at 9.
196.
EDWARDS, supra note 8, at 3 (quoting Michael Porter). While Porter chose particularly
dramatic phrases to express his views, he is not alone in espousing those views. Id.
197.
Id. at 3–4 (citing Kurt Hoffman, director of the Shell Foundation, and other business
leaders).
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This Part argues that each side has gotten it wrong. While the current
debate over the purpose and impact of philanthropic endeavors is a useful
one, both sides fail to recognize the essential nature of the transformations
that are occurring in the realm of philanthropy. This Part proposes that the
critical and most significant transformations and developments in this
realm are twofold—First, philanthropic change is directly and historically
linked to business innovation—a link that has so far gone largely
unrecognized.198 Second, the current debates over improving charitable
entities mask the novel philanthropic innovation of our time, that is, that
information technology from the business realm is transforming
philanthropy by being directly applied to and in support of charitable
endeavors.
Again, in doing so, this Article enters the debate over new forms of
philanthropy by offering a new way of understanding the current revolution
in philanthropy. After applying this relatively unrecognized lens based on
the nexus between capitalistic and philanthropic entrepreneurialism, this
Part proposes some alternative paths to change, arguing that current
legislative and private responses and constructions are inadequately
addressing this revolution. It further analyzes how legislative and publicprivate approaches can support rather than subvert positive change in the
field of philanthropy.
This Part then moves to a discussion of the financial crisis, which has
led to calls for a more “creative” and healthy capitalism,199 and the
emergence of vast wealth and innovation in technology companies which
has in turn led to the development of a new dynamic environment for
philanthropy.
A. Creative Capitalism and Its Impact on Philanthropy
This Subpart describes some of the currently developing philanthropic
innovations, providing examples of how information technology has been
merged with philanthropic aims, creating a new era of charitable
entrepreneurialism.
The concept of “disruptive strategic innovation” has been used to
describe a new method of competition and entrepreneurship, one that

198.
See supra, Introduction; see also Acs & Phillips, supra note 8, at 189 (“This
entrepreneurship–philanthropy nexus has not been fully explored by either economists or the general
public. . . . [Furthermore] [i]f we do not analyze philanthropy we can understand neither how economic
development occurred nor what accounts for American economic dominance.”).
199.
See New Masters of the Universe, How State Enterprise Is Spreading, THE ECONOMIST (Jan.
21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21542925 (discussing alternatives to current forms of
capitalism such as state capitalism and noting that new varieties of “state capitalism” all have something
in common—politicians have far more power than they do under liberal capitalism).
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emerges as “a new way of competing in the industry that is both different
from and in conflict with the traditional way.”200
The critical transformative technology of our time can be termed “ephilanthropy.” “[E]-philanthropy provides a new architecture to an existing
service. It emphasizes different product or service attributes. With the
increase in options for both organizations and users, along with the
flexibility, speed, and fee [sic] alternatives, it also brings to market a very
different value proposition than had been available.”201 Today, new online
platforms are emerging and changing the nature of philanthropy; some, for
example, are using technology to “put[] the power of setting charitable
priorities and targeted giving into the hands of individuals instead of large
institutions. The fundraising goals that participants set tend to be relatively
small and tightly focused—a few hundred dollars to finance a job search
here, a few thousand to start a neighborhood garden there—but technology
is expanding the reach of both donors and recipients”202 in a way many
philanthropists believe is changing the way philanthropy has traditionally
been conducted.203 These new entities have been called or characterized as
many capitalistic forms, such as venture philanthropy or philanthropy
relying on a stock market for philanthropy.204 Other examples include the
Omidyar Network, where the founder of eBay is trying to develop an entity
that makes for-profit investments, but has as its ultimate goal to give all of
its funds away.205

200.
Chung-Shing Lee, Eli Berniker, Glenn Van Wyhe & Kenneth J. Johnson, E-Commerce
Disruptive Innovations in Charity and Non-Profit Fund Raising, 5 J. STRATEGIC E-COMMERCE 39, at
44 (2005).
201.
Id. (citation omitted).
202.
Katie Morrell, How the Internet is Reshaping Philanthropy, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 19,
2012), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120317/ISSUE02/303179996/how-crowdfunding-isreshaping-philanthropy.
203.
Matt Petronzio, Viral Philanthropy: The Impact of Crowdsourced Compassion,
MASHABLE.COM (July 11, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/07/11/viral-philanthropy/; Carla Rivera,
Charities Plug into the Internet in Quest for Donations and Volunteers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at
B11; COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, PHILANTHROPY IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (2000),
available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/philanthropy.pdf.
204.
DAVID BONBRIGHT, NATALIA KIRYTTOPOULOU & LINDSAY IVERSEN, ONLINE
PHILANTHROPY MARKETS: FROM ‘FEEL-GOOD’ GIVING TO EFFECTIVE SOCIAL INVESTING? (2008),
available
at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/psi/nspp_Keystone_
OnlinePhilanthropyMarkets.pdf (describing corporate philanthropist’s goal to create an ecosystem like
the stock market for philanthropic purposes); Geoffrey Colvin, The Gift of Arrogance: It’s Blessed to
Give—But It’s a Lot Harder than Nethead Philanthropists Thought, FORTUNE (Dec. 24, 2001),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2001/12/24/315343/index.htm;
Naren
Karunakaran, High Net-Worth Individuals Turning to Philanthropy, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Feb. 24,
2011, 6:07 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-02-24/news/ 28627950_1_newrole-models-spiritual-experience-high-net-worth-individuals (describing online philanthropy markets as
websites connecting individual donors with charitable organizations internationally).
205.
BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 1, at 174. See also About Us, OMIDYAR NETWORK,
http://www.omidyar.com/about_us (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (stating that the “Omidyar Network is a
philanthropic investment firm dedicated to harnessing the power of markets to create opportunity for
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Perhaps the most significant example is that of social networking and
how it has been applied in the philanthropic realm. Social networking,
while commercially successful, is increasingly being exploited as a tool for
philanthropy. Some examples are discussed below.
One notable example is that of Crowdrise.com. This site provides a
tool to enable individuals to promote particular charitable causes through
their social network.206 Thus far, the site appears to have been successful;
one campaign using Crowdrise exceeded its $2 million fund raising
target.207 Crowdrise takes advantage of social networks to “market”
charitable causes in an effective way. Significantly, under U.S. law,
Crowdrise can only raise money through deductions; it cannot offer
investors a return on investments.208 It is thus stifled in its attempts to raise
money for charitable causes, unable to make use of investments that may
be leveraged into larger philanthropic endeavors—restrictions that must be
changed for such entities to achieve their full potential.
Social networking sites and many others rely principally on advertising
revenue. Philanthropic ventures have also found ways to tap advertising for
charitable purposes. Social network campaigns such as Crowdrise call on
users to donate their money, but cannot accept investments. Sites such as
Freerice.com do not ask for money donations; instead the sites themselves
donate advertising revenue.209 Advertising revenue is dependent on the
presence of users on the site. The user’s donation is in effect their time.

people to improve their lives. We invest in and help scale innovative organizations to catalyze
economic and social change. . . . The formation of Omidyar Network was inspired by Pierre’s
experience at eBay, which he founded in 1995 based on his beliefs in the potential of individuals and
the power of markets. Starting from the premise that people are basically good, Pierre created a
platform that gave everyone equal access to information, opportunity, and the tools to pursue their
goals. eBay allowed people to connect with others over shared interests and provided them incentives,
like public feedback, to engage constructively with trading partners, thereby owning their marketplace
reputation and ultimate success. Those principles of access, connection, and ownership influenced the
Omidyars’ approach to philanthropy. While eBay was still a young company, Pierre and Pam cofounded The Omidyar Foundation to support nonprofits. Watching eBay scale in size and social impact
solidified their understanding that business could also be an effective tool for making the world a better
place. In response, they broadened their scope to form Omidyar Network, which makes investments in
for-profit companies as well as grants to nonprofit organizations, with social impact being the unifying
criterion for investment. . . . We support organizations whose market-based approach has the capacity
for large-scale, catalytic impact.”).
206.
Bruce Trachtenberg, Nonprofit Newswire: Crowdrise—Online Fundraising with a Few
Twists, NON-PROFIT Q., (May 14, 2010, 11:54 AM), http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/updates/2367nonprofit-newswire-crowdrise-online-fundraising-with-a-few-twists.html.
207.
Press Release, Amelia Gingold, Water for People Surpasses $2 Million Goal for Campaign
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.waterforpeople.org/media-center/press-release/donate-to-drink-surpassedgoal.html.
208.
See supra note 200.
209.
Web Game Provides Rice for the Hungry, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2007, 10:29 GMT)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7088447.stm.
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Through the site (and more generally through the commercial model of
internet advertising) the donor’s time becomes money for charity.210
Another creative and emblematic example is that of Goodsearch, LLC.
Goodsearch refers to a “family of websites” that raises funds for nonprofits
and schools without cost to these entities from common online activities
such as searching and shopping.211 Significantly, Goodsearch seeks to
apply search algorithms developed for sites such as Yahoo! into its
philanthropic projects,212 thus providing a model of how current
transformative business innovation can be directly applied into the
philanthropic realm. It further is a strong example of applying “disruptive
technology” in the form of e-philanthropy. It provides evidence for the
proposition that “[t]here are a number of compelling reasons over and
above pure altruism for individuals to be charitable.”213
There are a host of other fascinating examples, including
GiveForward,214 Kickstarter,215 and everyonegives.org.216 Each is
considered to be part of a philanthropic wave “that’s changing the shape of
philanthropy.”217 Again, however, in the United States, these entities are
hampered by their inability to seek investors along with donations.
Thus, the world of current philanthropic innovations includes not only
hybrid entities, but a full range of entities operating at different points on
the for-profit/non-profit and entrepreneurial spectrum.

210.
For additional examples, see generally Davis & Gelpern, supra note 89, at 1212 (“Mapping
the space occupied by these new ‘peer-to-peer’ intermediaries is difficult: it spans multiple jurisdictions
and governance regimes and embraces a vast and growing variety of legal forms.”) (also discussing
microfinancing intermediary websites such as Kiva).
211.
See Goodsearch Announces Scott Garells Joins As CEO, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 2, 2011, 8:05
AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110302005839/en/GoodSearch-Announces-ScottGarell-Joins-CEO.
212.
Id.
213.
Rees, supra note 51.
214.
“GiveForward is one of a handful of online philanthropic platforms sprouting up around
Chicago. They’re part of a broader crowdfunding wave that’s changing the shape of philanthropy . . . .”
Morrell, supra note 202.
215.
Kickstarter (a crowdfunding site) made a stir last year “when a co-founder noted that the
New York-based arts microfunding site was on track to distribute more than $150 million this year—
more than the National Endowment for the Arts’ fiscal year 2012 budget.” Id.
216.
Everyone Gives uses Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Youtube to raise money in an annual
fundraising drive for multiple charities. A recent press release notes:
“Everyone Gives,” the world’s first social giving campaign of its kind, raised $741,213 USD
in just 17 days. From February 22 to March 9, 2012, more than 12,000 individuals in 474
cities donated to 1,479 charities. During this time period, participants in 64 countries made
donations of every size to charities of their choice and were encouraged to use their social
networks to invite friends, families and colleagues to give.
Press Release, Everyone Gives, First Global Social Giving Campaign “Everyone Gives” Makes Its
Mark (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/first-global-social-giving-campaigneveryone-gives-makes-its-mark-145797215.html.
217.
Morrell, supra note 202.
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In this light, the questions we must seek to answer in achieving
proactive regulatory reform and improvement should be aimed at the new
forms of philanthropic entrepreneurialism now emerging. As one
commentator put it:
Today, as problems have grown increasingly complex, a big
question is how can we reorganize the problem-solving work of
society so it is more responsive to needs. Three generations ago,
the federal government could address many forms of injustice
through legislation—mandating a 40-hour workweek, instituting a
minimum wage, establishing housing codes. Today, our societal
challenges—in education, health, or the environment—demand
innovation from many directions.
We don’t know where the best ideas will come from any more
than we know where the next Google will arise. The emergence of
social entrepreneurship reflects this uncertainty—as well as a
major new opportunity: the fact that the capacity and motivation
needed to solve problems is now widely dispersed. The question is,
how do we find, elicit, nurture and harness the talents of millions
of potential change-makers for the greatest good? It’s not just a
question for would-be social entrepreneurs. It’s relevant for policy
makers, managers, educators, parents—and ourselves.218
Yet the innovative philanthropic social media entities described above
are operating in a legal vacuum, one that must be filled for such innovation
to survive and thrive.219 To the above questions that must be answered, I
would add that our regulatory framework must attempt to address the needs
of philanthropy that crosses national borders, whether they operate
transnationally through technology or by virtue of their goals.220 The next
Subpart conducts a preliminary evaluation of the current regulatory
framework and gaps, and calls for lawmakers to address these gaps in a
manner that will support philanthropic innovation.

218.
Bornstein, supra note 114.
219.
See generally Morrell, supra note 202.
220.
See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and
Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600-2000, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 32, 58 (noting that the “forces shaping the future of American nonprofits
do not originate solely in the United States. In recent years, a variety of new kinds of nongovernmental
organizations have emerged which operate globally. Some of these are domestically based entities that
provide services abroad. Others are genuinely transnational, involving cooperative and collaborative
relationships among advocates, funders, and service providers operating across national borders. Many
of these pursue broad humanitarian agendas, promoting sustainable development, human rights,
economic and environmental justice, and other causes that seek to advance the well-being of humanity
in general rather than that of particular nations.”).
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B. The Need for Regulatory Flexibility
We appear to be entering an era of regulatory lag, where the legal
frameworks surrounding philanthropies are not only in great flux, but also
contain significant gaps. While piecemeal attempts have been made to
accommodate for-profit/non-profit hybrids, the legal structures necessary to
support the transformation of social media and related technologies for
philanthropic ends simply does not exist in the United States. Thus, in
order for new and transformative philanthropic entities to flourish, we need
to create greater regulatory flexibility to keep up with, rather than lag
behind market and philanthropic innovation.
One specific area of regulatory lag concerns currently crowdfunding
enterprises,221 which have already been legalized and are growing in the
U.K.222 Crowdfunding organizations represent a new innovation in that
they seek to use the power of social media to fundraise, yet are limited by
current law to donative, as opposed to investment, enterprises. In contrast
to the U.K., in the United States crowdfunding enterprises are currently are
operating in a murky gray area. Just last year, crowdfunding enterprises
were not even legally able to operate in the United States.223
However, on April 5, 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act.224 This Act was intended to ease the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s restrictions regarding “how new
stock offerings in start-ups are publicized and sold to individuals, including
over the internet.”225 These restrictions, contained in the Securities Act of
1933, were intended to protect individual investors, but effectively barred
crowdfunding in the United States by prohibiting general solicitation and

221.
The term crowdfunding generally refers to the use of the internet by small businesses to raise
capital through limited investments from a large number of investors. See C. Steven Bradford,
Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012) (stating that “[t]he
basic idea of crowdfunding is to raise money through relatively small contributions from a large number
of people,” frequently using the internet). It is important to note that charitable entities seeking
donations, as opposed to investments, are currently legal. See Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding
Exemption? Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TENN. J. BUS. L. 63,
64 & 79–83 (2011).
222.
See Adrianne Jeffries, The U.K. Already Has Equity-Based Crowdfunding, and This Startup
Just Set a Record, BETABEAT (June 8, 2012, 8:52 AM), http://betabeat.com/2012/06/the-u-k-alreadyhas-equity-based-crowdfunding-and-this-startup-just-set-a-record/.
223.
See, e.g., Angus Loten, Crowd-Funding Brings Unease, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203611404577042333598282986.html?mod=WSJ_Te
ch_LEFTTopNews (noting restrictions on equity-based crowdfunding in late 2011).
224.
See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
225.
Theresa W. Carey, Adventurous Capital: SEC Eases Limits on Venture Investing by
Individuals, BARRONS.COM (Sept. 8, 2012), http://online.barrons.com/article/SB5000142405311
1904294104577631472073678432.html.
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advertisement of enterprises through the mechanisms crowdfunding
organizations were attempting to use.226
The U.S., as compared to the U.K., has failed to recognize the
differences between emerging firms like Kickstarter.com and traditional
intermediaries. The failure of the U.S. to recognize the differences in these
respective entities, and to support emerging firms like Kickstarter.com, has
left the U.S. with a competitive disadvantage. Specifically, this lack of
recognition and the corresponding lack of regulatory action means that the
regulatory framework governing crowdfunding enterprises in the United
States is falling significantly behind the regulatory framework in the UK.
As one commentator describes the situation:
U.S.-based crowdfunding sites like Kickstarter, Indiegogo and
ArtistShare offer a huge range of creative perks like T-shirts,
backstage access, chip clips, or a week’s worth of personal training
alongside Bret Easton Ellis. But what if a startup could offer equity
in the company to the little people who helped make it happen?
The JOBS Act, passed in April, gave the SEC a directive to
clear the path for equity-based crowdfunding (some call it
“crowdinvesting”) sites. The regulatory agency is [still as of this
writing] deliberating over the rules . . . .227
I urge U.S. regulators not only to take into account the competitive
disadvantage the U.S. is facing discussed above, but also to continue to
consider the need for consumer protection. Balancing these issues is a
complex task, yet is one I believe can be accomplished by allowing
individual investors to invest in “crowdinvesting sites” at the same time
that regulators could maintain a watchful eye over these organizations and
step in to protect investors when necessary.
Meanwhile, across the pond, equity-based crowdfunding is
already legal and underway. A London-based startup called Escape
the City has raised £557,920 (roughly $892,481) on a £600,000
goal with 14 days to go on the equity crowdfunding platform
Crowdcube. The startup upped its goal because of high demand.
Escape the City is a social network somewhere between LinkedIn
226.
Id. For a more detailed explanation of how this is supposed to work, see Ben Protess,
Regulator Seeks Feedback on JOBS Act, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Apr. 11,
2012),http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/regulator-seeks-feedback-on-jobs-act/ (“The JOBS Act
also exempts small companies from various public disclosure requirements, while blessing a new form
of financing to start-up companies known as crowdfunding that allows companies to go online to raise
up to $1 million by pooling mass solicitations.”). Notably, these changes are to be implemented in an
atmosphere where the S.E.C. has argued that lighter regulations would weaken investor protections. Id.
227.
Jeffries, supra note 222.
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and Idealist.org; it aims to match dissatisfied corporate drones with
new jobs, more noble jobs, or professional adventures abroad.228
In this light, the JOBS Act offers the U.S. an opportunity to facilitate
the development of entities like Kickstarter.com, and perhaps regain its
lead in philanthropic innovation. Specifically, the JOBS Act requires the
SEC to adopt rules to implement a new exemption to its investor protection
rules that will allow crowdfunding.229 Until these rules are implemented,
crowdfunding is technically unlawful under federal securities laws.230
While the JOBS Act, if implemented, could revolutionize internet and
social media philanthropies, its implementation is currently mired in intraagency battles and vague rules that leave unclear which activities are legal
and which are not. The SEC was supposed to issue the first set of rules on
this issue on July 5, 2012, but this was repeatedly rescheduled until August
29, 2012.231 On that date, the SEC released proposed rules aimed at
eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation and general
advertising in “certain securities offerings” including crowdfunding.232
These proposed rules are intended to permit companies to use general
solicitation and general advertising to offer securities under Rule 506 of
Regulation D of the Securities Act and Rule 144A of the Securities Act.233
At the time of this writing, the comment period had closed, and no
interim or final rule had been issued.234 During the public commentary
period the proposed rules were criticized for their vagueness and for
leaving the legality of crowdfunding activities murky.235
To give effect to the JOBS Act, the SEC must approve the rule changes
adopted by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), Wall-

228.
Id.
229.
Information Regarding the Use of the Crowdfunding Exemption in the JOBS Act, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/jobsact/ crowdfundingexemption.htm.
230.
Id.
231.
Chance Barnett, First S.E.C. Ruling Launch Crowdfunding with Accrediteds, FORBES.COM
(Aug. 30, 2012, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2012/08/30/ first-s-e-c-rulingslaunch-crowdfunding-with-accrediteds/.
232.
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Rules to Implement JOBS Act
Provision About General Solicitation and Advertising in Securities Offerings (Aug. 29, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-170.htm.
233.
Id.
234.
Id.
235.
See, e.g., E-mail from Stephen Dresner, Chief Exec. Officer, DealFlow Analytics, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 29, 2012) (available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-173.pdf) (taking issue with the “reasonable steps”
language in the proposed rule eliminating the prohibition against general solicitations and general
advertising for Rule 506 and Rule 144A offerings).
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Street’s self-regulator.236 The SEC will also likely have to create a new
process for smaller companies, such as crowdfunding entities, to file
confidential disclosures.237
At the time of this writing, it appears that the regulatory changes
resulting from the JOBS Act have left companies wary rather than
encouraged.238 At a minimum, these rules should be clarified and
strengthened to permit and encourage crowdfunding enterprises to operate
legally in the United States. Currently, crowdfunding operations may run
afoul of investment regulations when they seek investors or offer equity
stakes in a philanthropic endeavor.239 It is important to note that traditional
charitable organizations organized under § 501(c)(3) rules are allowed to
seek donations over the internet;240 rather, it is venture and investment
based entities that are stifled by existing regulations. If such investmentbased entities were allowed to freely operate, this could usher in a new
wave of philanthropic innovation, using the power of social media to raise
investments, not just donations, for philanthropic causes—perhaps creating
the as yet elusive ideal of a truly sustainable donative organization.
Regulators continue to make gradual steps towards the implementation
of the new rules required by the JOBS Act. In January 2013, FINRA issued
a voluntary interim form seeking information from crowdfunding
portals,241 followed in February by a list of frequently asked questions

236.
See generally Protess, supra note 226 (“[The SEC] will have to approve rule changes
adopted by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Wall Street’s self-regulator, which is likely to
relax some of its policies to comply with the JOBS Act.”).
237.
See id.; see also FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATION AUTHORITY, REGULATORY NOTICE 1234, JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS ACT: FINRA REQUESTS COMMENT ON PROPOSED
REGULATION OF CROWDFUNDING ACTIVITIES (2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p131268.pdf
(soliciting
public
comment
on
development of registered funding portal rules and application of FINRA rules to crowdfunding
activities by broker-dealers).
238.
See Jessica Holzer, Some Firms Shun Looser IPO Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2012, at C1
(describing how some companies are shying away from the looser requirements stemming from the
JOBS Act).
239.
Burkett, supra note 221, at 64, 78–83.
240.
As of the date of this writing, the IRS has just recently advised that there is no prohibition
against a charitable organization using an internet fundraising platform to raise money, explaining that
the charity must comply with the rules that apply to other solicitations and must ensure that its
fundraising programs are structured in a manner consistent with § 501(c)(3) status. See I.R.S. Info.
Letter 2013-0001 (Mar. 29, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/13-0001.pdf. While this
letter clarifies law, it does not address the problem described above that social network campaigns such
as Crowdrise.com cannot accept investments.
241.
News Release, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA Issues Voluntary Interim
Form
for
Crowdfunding
Portals
(Jan.
10,
2013),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2013/P197636 (“Those intending to become a funding
portal may voluntarily submit information regarding their business on the interim form. The
information received will help FINRA develop rules specific to crowdfunding portals.”).
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regarding the JOBS Act exemptions, released by the SEC.242 The SEC has
also granted exemptions to two crowdfunding portals under existing rules.
Both portals deal only with accredited investors rather than the general
public.243 In addition, the portals are compensated through a stake in the
businesses they fund, rather than through commission.244
In any case, the JOBS Act is just one piece of a broader package of
regulatory reforms needed to support the current wave of philanthropic
entrepreneurship.245 The broader problem remains the need to reform our
legal institutions so as to facilitate philanthropies leveraging the
technological and commercial developments related to the internet and
social media.246 State laws, for example, may offer fertile ground for
experimentation in this area, as they have been a laboratory of change for
emerging hybrid entities, 247 and could do so again for philanthropies who
seek to leverage social media and internet technologies to raise money and
operated in novel ways.
To fully support American philanthropic innovation, we need to
identify ways to support social entrepreneurship in the social media arena,

242.
Frequently Asked Questions About the Exemption from Broker–Dealer Registration in Title
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N
(Feb
5,
2013),
II
of
the
JOBS
Act,
U.S.
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/exemption-broker-dealer-registration-jobs-act-faq.htm.
243.
Steve Quinlivan, SEC Exempts Another Crowd Funding Site from Broker–Dealer Rules,
MAKING SENSE OF DODD-FRANK (Mar. 29, 2013), http://dodd-frank.com/sec-exempts-another-crowdfunding-site-from-broker-dealer-rules/. SEC issued no-action letters to AngelFund and
thefundersclub.com. Letter from David W. Blass, Chief Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of
Trading & Markets, to Robert H. Rosenblum, K&L Gates (Mar. 28, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2013/angellist-15a1.pdf; Letter from David W.
Blass, Chief Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Trading & Markets, to W. Hardy Callcott,
Bingham McCutchen LLP (Mar. 26, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrnoaction/2013/funders-club-032613-15a1.pdf.
244.
See id.
245.
For further proposals of regulatory reforms to support philanthropic entrepreneurship, see
Henderson & Malani, supra note 15, at 609, 611 (recommending that the government “allow all
consumers to deduct the charitable component of the green goods they purchase,” “allow all consumers
to deduct donations of cash or assets to nonprofit organizations,” and “tax donations of stock and other
appreciated assets the same as donations of cash to nonprofits”). For other examples of philanthropic
entrepreneurialism using internet technology, see generally Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas,
Democratizing Foreign Aid: Online Philanthropy and International Development Assistance, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1111 (2010); Melissa G. Liazos, Comment, Can States Impose Registration
Requirements on Online Charitable Solicitors?, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1379 (2000).
246.
As this Article goes to press, the U.S. regulatory landscape regarding emerging forms of
social entrepreneurship is in a state of flux, as discussed above. Thus, fully analyzing the regulatory
framework the U.S. should develop to address these issues is a question I hope to return to in future
work. In this Subpart, I focus on analyzing the case of crowdfunding regulation in order to illustrate
some of the ways the U.S. could move forward by increasing regulatory flexibility, informed by the
historical and comparative analyses such as the analyses in this paper.
247.
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12599 (West 2006) (California state law regulating
professional fundraising for charity); see also CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR
CHARITIES 26–32 (2005), available at http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/charities/publications/
guide_for_charities.pdf.
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encouraging growth and innovation without stifling registration, structural,
or disclosure requirements, while maintaining accountability
mechanisms248 and regulatory flexibility.249
Specifically, as discussed above, we should consider changes to crowdfunding rules, securities laws, changes to hybrid form laws, and look to
lessons from abroad to create the most fertile atmosphere for philanthropic
innovation.
This Article has attempted to demonstrate how the existing legal
literature has focused on hybrid entities at the expense of emerging and
potentially transformative philanthropic entrepreneurial activities.
Currently, the primary obstacles to such innovation (or innovations seeking
to creatively utilize internet technologies) are not tax or corporate structure
laws, but rather securities and investor and consumer protection laws,
which have not yet caught up to entrepreneurial activity in the
philanthropic realm. If we fail to recognize this neglected perspective in the
dominant legal paradigm, we risk losing out on innovative philanthropic
developments as well as falling behind other countries. As noted above, the
United Kingdom has already legalized crowdfunding organizations, and if
we do not act quickly, we risk losing our competitive edge as philanthropy
progresses and flowers around the world.250
At the same time, the law surrounding hybrid entities should be
clarified so that founders of hybrid entities are not forced to choose
between either for-profit or non-profit structures—there is no reason to
throw out the baby with the bathwater. Also, transparency, accountability,
and mission-fulfillment mechanisms should be developed to prevent the
regulatory failures and fill the regulatory gaps noted supra. For example,
anti-fraud and consumer rules must also be changed to prevent noncharitable entities from bilking individual investors.251
Finally, lasting philanthropic reform should contain a comparative
element that recognizes and supports American exceptionalism in
supporting philanthropic innovation in the private sector. As noted, the

248.
See Lieber, supra note 49, at 744 (noting that the “coming of the Internet Age” poses serious
new problems to a legal structure governing philanthropy that is not yet up to speed in detecting the
latest in online fraud and abuse, and providing examples).
249.
Cf. ADRIAN SARGEANT & JEN SHANG, GROWING PHILANTHROPY IN THE UNITED STATES: A
REPORT ON THE JUNE 2011 WASHINGTON, D.C. GROWING PHILANTHROPY SUMMIT 11–12, 17 (2011),
available at https://www.blackbaud.com/files/resources/downloads/whitepaper_growingphilanthropy
report.pdf (describing recommendations from a non-profit summit and emphasizing honesty in
reporting, accountability, and philanthropic best practices in social media).
250.
Tim Rowe, The New Law that Will Turn the Start-Up World Upside Down: Crowdfunding,
ALL THINGS D (Mar. 15, 2012, 1:35 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20120315/the-new-law-that-will-turnthe-start-up-world-upside-down-crowdfunding/.
251.
Frank Greve, In the Internet Era, It’s Donor Beware, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIBUNE NEWS
SERVICE (Dec. 28, 1999), available at LexisNexis; Liazos, supra note 245.
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Unites States has provided particularly fertile ground for innovation and
entrepreneurship.252 We should not cede this ground to other countries. The
United Kingdom has already legalized crowdfunding organizations and
other countries are rapidly researching and developing new methods of
social entrepreneurship.253 The United States should follow suit, to
recognize and support its competitive edge and its unique ties between its
commercial and philanthropic sectors to maintain its lead as the land of
philanthropic innovation.
At the same time, comparative analyses also suggest that the United
States should not undermine the legitimacy and ability of the government
sector to provide philanthropic measures. For instance, in China, anecdotal
evidence suggests that the lack of trust among the general public in staterun philanthropies has stunted government-based philanthropy while
pushing
philanthropic
entrepreneurs
towards
private
social
entrepreneurship.254 The United States has a unique atmosphere that can
support both public and private philanthropy and philanthropic innovation,
and we should support, not weaken, this atmosphere through proactive
regulation and transparency.
Adopting an approach of regulatory flexibility will go a long way
toward creating a positive atmosphere for organizations applying social
media and other technological and commercial innovations towards
philanthropic ends. Adopting an approach based on regulatory flexibility
would provide a start to developing a proactive legal regime that would
promote, rather than hinder, philanthropic innovation, especially innovation
focusing on social media and e-philanthropy. The analysis this Article has
presented suggests the need for a broad package of legal and regulatory
reforms. While fully outlining these reforms is beyond the scope of this
Article (and also hinges on the outcome of current attempts at regulatory
change), the approach suggested here is intended to spark the larger
dialogue necessary for comprehensive reform.255 Hopefully, through such

252.
See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSON, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: THE REVOLUTIONARY BOOK
THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU DO BUSINESS (1997).
253.
Rowe, supra note 250.
254.
See Juliana Lu, Social Entrepreneurship Takes Off in China, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2012,
11:38 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19652712.
255.
As this Article goes to press, the U.S. regulatory landscape regarding philanthropic and
emerging forms of social entrepreneurship is changing rapidly, as discussed above. As the legal and
regulatory framework for such entities solidifies, I plan to address these topics more fully in future
work. As a comprehensive examination of the currently developing regulatory framework is beyond the
scope of this paper, in this paper, I have focused on analyzing the case of the regulation of
crowdfunding. Looking at this case study reveals the ways in which the US regulatory landscape is in
flux and illustrates how the U.S. should develop an approach to regulatory flexibility in many areas in
light of the historical and comparative analyses set forth supra in this paper.
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reform, we can emerge from this period of regulatory lag and financial and
social turmoil in a way that will enhance philanthropic innovation.
In sum, we are living in a time of great social, technological, and
philanthropic change. It is moments like this that lead to bursts of progress
and innovation, in ways that would have been inconceivable just a decade
ago. This Article has attempted to identify and analyze some of the seismic
shifts occurring in the business and charitable realms. It seeks to take this
analysis further, by seeking to propose methods for ameliorating the
problems of the past while working towards a more efficient, less
contentious, and proactive path and methodologies for positive change.
Ultimately, I hope that the entrepreneurial-philanthropic nexus continues to
go in both directions, and that this information sharing and idea
dissemination can enhance progress both in the business realm and the
philanthropic realm.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to shed light on some understudied aspects
of philanthropic innovation. Such innovation should not be viewed just
through the narrow lens of tax or corporate structure regulations, but rather
through a broader historical and comparative lens that reveals the deep
links between philanthropic innovations and market commercial and
technological developments. Indeed, analyzing philanthropic innovation
may provide insights into the future of capitalism as its wrestles with
notions related to both profit and philanthropy. In this light, legislation
should allow for flexibility in form and regulation of philanthropies,
allowing for the formation of creative philanthropic structures. At the same
time, regulatory regimes should still seek to regulate these new
philanthropic endeavors, for example by implementing additional
transparency, accountability, and consumer protection mechanisms.
This Article has sought to add to the dominant paradigm on
philanthropic innovation and has attempted to focus attention on a largely
unrecognized but significant link between philanthropic and market
entrepreneurialism. These debates and insights are significant in this time
of flux and the blurring of lines between public and private in the United
States, and can enhance the dialogue as to where we go from here in terms
of both sustaining philanthropic entrepreneurship and supporting and
enhancing creative capitalism. To end with a prescient quote:
In the final analysis, the future of American philanthropy—and to
some yet-unknown degree the future of America itself—depends
upon the collective imagination of its philanthropists. Thus far,
they have created much that we all cherish, and a little of what we
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most abhor about our civilization. That dichotomy won’t end. In
fact, it seems certain that the impact of philanthropy on our society
and our lives will increase as philanthropists and philanthrocrats
become more proficient at leveraging their money and have more
money to leverage. The products of their imaginations will
continue to excite and infuriate us.256
If we can promote and support the imaginations of today’s philanthropic
entrepreneurs, we can foster the growth of creative attempts to harness
market mechanisms to enhance philanthropic impact, while also providing
the space for new, groundbreaking philanthropic endeavors that could help
provide solutions to many of our current societal dilemmas. We should
continue to study the nature of philanthropic entrepreneurialism and change
to draw out the lessons they provide for transformative technological and
philanthropic endeavors.

256.

DOWIE, supra note 6, at 245.

